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This thesis examines the Morrill Hall Takeover of January, 1969, and the creation
of the Afro-American Studies Department at the University of Minnesota-Twin Cities.
Further, it follows the process of sustaining a black studies department including
acquiring qualified professors, maintaining student interest, negotiating the relationship
to the black community and overcoming funding shortages, as well as other bureaucratic
difficulties. The events at the University of Minnesota are placed in the larger context of
the long-term development of black studies, the rise of the Black Power Movement and
Minnesota’s tradition of liberalism. This work draws on reports from the University of
Minnesota Archives, papers held at the Minnesota Historical Society, interviews,
newspaper coverage of the takeover and subsequent department development, and
secondary texts on black studies and black power.

3
Introduction

In January, 1969, at the University of Minnesota-Twin Cities, black students took
over Morrill Hall, an administrative building, to press the school to create a black studies
department. They played a small, but important part in a concert of black student revolts
occurring across the country at the time. At a school with roughly 40,000 students, a
group of less than 100 African Americans made their presence felt and spurred the
creation of a department that has educated thousands of students about black history and
culture up to this day. Whereas other schools erupted in violence and black students
faced repression, the University of Minnesota stood out for its peaceful change. In fact,
university administrators noted,
The kind of issue raised by the [Afro-American Action Committee] is akin
to the kind raised at Columbia University, at Oberlin, at Oshkosh, San
Francisco State, Southern Illinois, and elsewhere. In no other case we
know has the issue been resolved more peaceably, with less violence and
property damage, with more rapidity, and with more satisfactory outcome
than this one at Minnesota.1
The takeovers in Minnesota and elsewhere arose as unmistakable manifestations
of the broader Black Power Movement. One of the foremost scholars of the Black Power
Era in America, Peniel E. Joseph, writes, “The ‘modern Black Studies Movement’
represented perhaps the greatest political and pedagogical opportunity to fundamentally
alter power relations in American society…While not completely successful, these efforts
should by no means be considered a failure. On the contrary, Black Studies programs
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remain one of the enduring and outstanding legacies of the Black Power Movement.”2 In
the case of Minnesota, black studies have certainly left an impact.
Though they were participants in the event and, thus, may be inclined to overstate
their legacy, Marie Braddock Williams, Rose Mary Freeman Massey and Horace Huntley
declare that,
[T]he University has never been quite the same. The ethnic composition
of its students, the content of its curriculum, the make up of student
service programs, not to mention the make up of its faculty and
administrators, have all been transformed into what the University looks
and feels like today. As a result, the University is more inclusive, more
tolerant, and less separated from the dynamics of the community which
owns it.
They conclude that the creation of an Afro-American Studies Department represents the
single most transformative event in the history of the University of Minnesota.3
However, the Morrill Hall takeover still has its detractors who feel it was the
wrong move. In 2006, following a reunion of the participants in the Morrill Hall
takeover, Katherine Kersten of the Minneapolis Star Tribune wrote a piece condemning
the celebration. She highlighted the damage done in 1969 saying that the group “trashed
university offices, stuffed student records in toilets and injured a fellow student” and
“scattered student financial and academic records about the offices.” Damage occurred.
But, Kersten failed to realize that most of the damage resulted from the creation of
barricades in response to threats from white students outside, who also damaged the
building.4
2

Peniel E. Joseph, “Dashikis and Democracy: Black Studies, Student Activism, and the Black Power
Movement,” The Journal of African American History 88, no. 2 (Spring, 2003), 182.
3
Marie Braddock Williams, Rose Freeman Massey, and Horace Huntley, “Nerve Juice” and the Ivory
Tower: Confrontation in Minnesota, The True Story of the Morrill Hall Takeover (Jonesboro, AR:
GrantHouse Publishers, 2006), xxii, 6.
4
Katherine Kersten, “University’s praise for 1969 violence sets ugly precedent,” Star Tribune, April 26,
2006, no page given.

5
Though she argued the damage was bad, she wrote that the administration’s
reaction was worse. Kersten called University President Malcolm Moos’ decision to
agree to the students’ demands a “cringing surrender of authority.” Though she noted
that Moos did this to avoid bloodshed, she condemned his decision nonetheless and
offered no alternative. She further stated, “Moos didn’t lift a finger against [the
students], or even criticize their actions.”5 But, the primary documents prove this
statement false. In fact, Malcolm Moos threatened to call the police in future incidents,
created a commission to investigate the takeover and offered testimony to the jury in the
students’ trial. Finally, Kersten concluded,
What did the leaders of the occupation get? A first-class lesson in how to
deal effectively with timid university officials. They learned that bullying
tactics can win rewards, and that if you shout loud enough, the university
may give you what you want. Last weekend, a new generation of students
looked on as U officials feted the leaders of the Morrill Hall takeover.
Listening to stories of that glorious day, these students may well have
learned the same ugly lesson.6
However, a closer examination of the events reveals bureaucracy had impeded
change. The only way to push a black studies program forward was to send a clear
message to the administration that delay was no longer an option. Moreover, one must
recognize the value of the students’ goal. For generations, professors ignored the
contributions of African Americans in the curricula at large, predominantly white
universities which produced an incomplete understanding of history and a narrow,
sometimes racist, outlook. In the end, the primary beneficiaries of the program created
by the Morrill Hall takeover were not the few black students who worked for change, but
the thousands of white students who later enrolled in black studies courses.

5
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In fact, today, the Journal of Blacks in Higher Education reports that black
studies is an unpopular major among African Americans. Only .8 percent of all
bachelor’s degrees awarded to African Americans in 2000 lay in the field of ethnic
studies. In fact, 29 times as many blacks earned a degree in business management. As a
group, African Americans have become more “careerist” in their college course
selections.7 Correspondingly, black studies programs and departments remain limited.
Only 9 percent of four-year colleges have a formalized black studies unit.8 So, why is it
important?
A historical look at black studies programs is valuable not only for seeing how
change occurs, but to look back at a time before black studies appeared on predominantly
white campuses because today black studies face attacks at many colleges and
universities. Specifically, many schools refuse to grant black studies full departmental
status. Numerous administrators do not consider it a legitimate academic discipline.
Instead of pursuing truth and enlightenment, black studies supposedly represent an
enclave of propaganda, victimology, and hate directed at whites. In an issue of the
National Review dated January 29, 2000, Dick Armey, a Representative from Texas and
House Majority Leader at the time, called black studies “pure junk” and “crib courses.”9
However, there is no evidence that black studies challenges students any less than
other programs.10 The experience at Minnesota shows that black studies courses were
often dense with information and conceptually difficult. In writing about the black
7

“Black Studies Is an Unpopular Major,” The Journal of Blacks in Higher Education 36 (Summer, 2002),
14-15.
8
Fabio Rojas, From Black Power to Black Studies: How a Radical Social Movement Became an Academic
Discipline (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007), 3.
9
“Black Studies: The Emerging Importance of Departmental Status,” The Journal of Blacks in Higher
Education 37 (Autumn, 2002), 24.
10
“Black Studies Is an Unpopular Major,” 15.

7
studies courses at the University of Minnesota, John Wright, a student in the 1970s and
later professor there, stated that the courses were rigorous and it was not a program where
students could just walk through. Moreover, black studies played an integral role in
attracting a more diverse student body which Wright called “absolutely necessary.”11
A document assessing the importance of the takeover and calling for funds to
produce scholarly research on the event notes that African American students now
constitute just over three percent of the undergraduate student enrollment. The Martin
Luther King Program and the African-American Studies Department remain an integral
part of campus academic life. Beyond that, the need for black cultural expression has
been represented in the work and programming efforts of the Black Student Cultural
Center, created in 1969.12 Finally, black studies provided a path to the creation of other
critical, but historically ignored areas of study. Wright contends, “All the subsequent
development of Chicano studies, American Indian studies, even Women’s studies and so
forth, all these lead to the issues that were raised and the institutional responses generated
by the Morrill Hall takeover in 1969.”13
The present study examines the Morrill Hall takeover at the University of
Minnesota and the work undertaken to create and sustain a black studies program there.
It attempts to place the events in Minneapolis in the context of the longer history of
African Americans in Minnesota and the larger movement for black studies and black
power nationwide. This work is intended to provide a case study of a black studies
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department to set alongside the few that have already been done. It engages the broader
arguments that have been presented about black studies by Fabio Rojas in From Black
Power to Black Studies as well as others to test their conclusions. Finally, it adds to the
longer history of social movements. Rather than looking only at the movement itself, this
work examines the durability of movement outcomes and the processes that stabilize or
erode a movement’s achievements.14
Understanding the events at the University of Minnesota allows one to see an
example of a black student revolt which did not produce violence and the role that both
students and administrators played in producing peaceful change. This situation shows
non-violent change produced by a Black Power organization. Minnesota’s location in
particular offers information useful to those looking at the various manifestations of
Black Power, in the North generally and the Upper Midwest specifically. It gives an
example of students trained in the southern organizing tradition in the early 1960s taking
part in a northern Black Power movement in the late 1960s.
Social movement historians should find interest in this study of a small group
forcing change and navigating bureaucracy. Less than 100 students at a university of
almost 50,000, currently the fourth largest in the country, changed the curriculum for the
long-term. They not only pushed the creation of an Afro-American Studies Department,
but also inspired the creation of other gender and ethnic studies departments. Moreover,
the black power group which spurred the creation of the department was led by a woman
and the department itself was chaired by women like Lillian Anthony and Geneva
Southall in its early years. Because black power groups and black studies departments

14
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have been criticized for sexism, Minnesota offers an interesting case study of women’s
leadership in those areas.
The events at the University of Minnesota should also be of interest to historians
of black studies as they highlight the connection and tension between campus and
community. This study also points out the tension between securing departmental
autonomy so black studies departments could be in charge of their own affairs and
gaining interdepartmental cooperation to connect the department to long-standing
disciplines. Further, it shows the changing backgrounds of professors over time as the
department initially relied on local people who often lacked academic degrees and later
hired professional educators as more people with black studies degrees arrived on the
market. This was not without its problems as Minnesota will reveal.
Beyond that, this thesis offers an important example of a black studies program
which primarily educated white students. It also documents the same problems that many
other black studies programs eventually faced with a shortage of funding and a decline of
student interest. On a broad level, the case of black studies at the University of
Minnesota both affirms and challenges parts of the dominant narrative on the history of
black studies. The various aspects of this story should serve as a contribution to
historians with a diversity of interests.
Peniel Joseph points out that “Organized student takeovers in support of black
studies transcended regional, racial, and class differences.”15 Though these black student
revolts took place everywhere from the Ivy League to land grant universities and were
supported by people of a variety of backgrounds, the takeovers themselves were not all

15
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the same. Thus, looking at the University of Minnesota helps scholars understand one of
the many manifestations of the black studies movement.

11
Chapter 1: “We Are Who We Were”: The History and Historiography of Black
Power, Black Studies, African Americans in Minnesota, and the University of
Minnesota

The historiography of black power student protest, especially on predominantly
white campuses, remains limited.16 The work that exists falls into a few distinct
categories: texts for African American studies courses which include a section on the
movements that led to their creation, specific case studies of colleges and universities that
experienced protest (mostly from the time, but also some more recent work), black power
histories which devote a section to the student movement, and a couple recent summative
works which look at black studies on a broad scale.
Before delving into the history of black studies, one should be clear about the
term. In their extensive examination of the field, Delores P. Aldridge and Carlene Young
begin, “African-American, Afro-American Studies, Black Studies, Pan-African Studies,
Africana, and Afro-Caribbean Studies are but different names for academic units that
focus on the systematic investigation of people of African descent in their contacts with
Europeans, their dispersal throughout the diaspora, and the subsequent institutionalization
of racism and oppression as means of economic, political, and social subordination.”17
Similarly, in this work, the terms will be used interchangeably while fundamentally
referring to the same field of inquiry. To more clearly identify what discipline these
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terms refer to, Aldridge later cites Alan Colon, whose definition of black studies is worth
quoting at length. He writes,
Black Studies is fundamentally corrective, descriptive, and proactive. It is
corrective in that the distortions and fallacies surrounding and projected
against blacks within the white universities are countered with factual
knowledge and critical interpretation. It is descriptive for it addresses the
past and present events that constitute the black experience by accurate
documentation with a perspective that utilizes, generates, and promotes
concepts, theories, programs, and movements toward the alleviation or
resolution of group problems faced by black people. It is proactive as it
encompasses the black intellectual tradition in the social sciences and
humanities, which simultaneously has been a type of praxis or unity
between intellectual work and collective efforts for effective qualitative
social change on behalf of the people of the African diaspora.18
With this understanding, one should note that in between the late 1960s or early
1970s and recent years, little work of historical value appeared on black studies. Instead,
numerous scholars focused on creating the materials for black studies programs. During
this time, Abdul Alkalimat and others published an Introduction to Afro-American
Studies: A People’s College Primer (1986) and Maulana Karenga wrote his Introduction
to Black Studies (1982). Works like these usually contained brief reflections on the
origins of black studies and the modern movement to install programs and departments at
the university level.
At the time of the black student revolts, some specific case studies appeared. San
Francisco State College became the first school to create a modern black studies program
and, consequently, also became the site of the most scholarly attention. Academic
contributions included Blow It Up! The Black Student Revolt at San Francisco State
College and the Emergence of Dr. Hayakawa (1971) by Dikran Karaqueuzian, By Any

18
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Means Necessary: The Revolutionary Struggle at San Francisco State (1970) and
Unfinished Rebellions (1971) by Robert Smith, Richard Axen, and DeVere Pentony,
College Days in Earthquake Country: Ordeal at San Francisco State, A Personal Record
(1971) by Leo Litwak and Herbert Wilner, and Shut It Down! A College in Crisis: San
Francisco State College, October 1968-April 1969 (1969) by William H. Orrick, Jr.19
Though San Francisco State received much attention, other schools also became
the subjects of scholarly analysis. Earl Anthony wrote The Time of the Furnaces: A Case
Study of Black Student Revolt (1971) about the movement at San Fernando Valley State
which stood out because of the severity of penalties imposed on students. The courts
found nineteen students of guilty of felonies; the first mass felony convictions of student
dissidents in American history.20 Meanwhile, Charles A. Frye conducted an anonymous
survey of three universities: one with a conservative, predominantly black population,
another with a progressive, largely white population, and the third with a constantly
growing black studies program. This resulted in his book The Impact of Black Studies on
the Curricula of Three Universities (1976). Tom Myles looked at the black student revolt
at a historically black college in Centennial Plus 1: A Photographic and Narrative
Account of the Black Student Revolution, Howard University, 1965-1968 (1969). Finally,
the rise of black studies in Ivy League schools received coverage in The Harvard Strike
(1970) by Lawrence Eichel and others and Black Studies in the University (1970),

19
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regarding the creation of a black studies program at Yale, edited by Armstead Robinson
and others.21 These works remain important as Ivy League schools tend to be trendsetters
spurring other universities to model their programs. Moreover, universities like Harvard
are today the site of the strongest black studies programs, at least in the prestige of their
faculty.
These works from the immediate period of can be coupled with more recent
works of historical scholarship. These include Donald Alexander Downs’ Cornell ’69:
Liberalism and the Crisis of the American University (1999), Wayne Glasker’s Black
Students in the Ivory Tower: African American Student Activism at the University of
Pennsylvania, 1967-1990 (2002), and Joy Williamson’s Black Power on Campus: The
University of Illinois, 1965-1975 (2003).22
In Glasker’s work on Penn, he looks at the connection between Black Nationalism
and student activism. He reveals that this Black Nationalist perspective did not lead
African Americans to isolate themselves from the larger white campus community. In
the first few chapters, he documents important examples of protest at Penn in the late
1960s, including demands for a black history course and a black studies program.23
Similarly, in Joy Williamson’s work on the Illinois campus in Urbana-Champaign, she
finds that black power ideology became central to the movement for educational
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change.24 However, Fabio Rojas criticizes their work for focusing exclusively on student
politics and failing to examine the long-term impact on two universities. They look at the
immediate aftermath, but do not explain what happens to movement achievements in the
long run.25
A few general studies were completed around the time of the student takeovers
including Black Power and Student Rebellion: Conflict on the American Campus (1969)
edited by James McEvoy and Abraham Miller.26 McEvoy and Miller divided their work
into three sections which offered heavily factual case studies, position papers by
participants, and an analysis of conditions which produced unrest. While not an
especially trenchant piece of historical scholarship, reviewer Charles E. Ramsey noted at
the time that the work offered some documents which would become of great use to
future historians.27
Nicholas Aaron Ford produced another general text near the end of the black
studies movement entitled and Black Studies: Threat or Challenge? (1973).28 Ford’s
book included a significant research contribution by presenting information gleaned from
personal interviews with teachers, students, and administrators at over 100 colleges. He
also analyzed questionnaires, college brochures, and college catalogs. Finally, Ford
presented a history of black studies courses before the 1960s, the various rationales for
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such programs, problems facing black students at predominantly white colleges, and
more.29
Recently, more summative texts on the creation of black studies programs have
appeared. In 2003, Delores P. Aldridge and Carlene Young edited a collection titled Out
of the Revolution: The Development of Africana Studies. However, Rojas offers the same
criticism of this collection as he does of the work of Glasker and Williamson: they
present a narrow timeframe which does not allow readers to grasp the longer history of
black studies. 30 Moreover, Aldridge and Young argue early on “There was indeed a
direct correlation between community activism and program implementation. The size,
quality, resources, and effectiveness of the Black Studies programs varied with the skill,
expertise, commitment, and community support of the implementer of each program.”31
While these sentences are open to more than one interpretation, the authors seem to be
contending that black studies programs were propelled by change coming from outside
the university. Though one cannot argue that the larger black power movement had
significant influence over black students pressing for change, especially in regards to
consciousness, community activists themselves often remained on the outside of student
movements for the creation of black studies.
This view is advanced by the most important text on black student revolts, which
arrived a few years later when Rojas published From Black Power to Black Studies: How
a Radical Social Movement became an Academic Discipline. Rojas covers some specific
case studies devoting a large chapter to San Francisco State College and another to the
29
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University of Illinois at Chicago, the University of Chicago, and Harvard University.
But, he also includes more general analysis gleaned from surveys and interviews and a
study of the Ford Foundation’s funding of black studies programs. He offers both a
sociological perspective examining how social movements and bureaucrats in the
university make change as well as historical analysis. The work of Fabio Rojas informs
this study of the University of Minnesota to a significant degree.
Beyond black studies in particular, this study fits into the larger historiography of
the Civil Rights and Black Power Movements. This includes works on armed self
defense like Timothy Tyson’s Radio Free Dixie: Robert F. Williams and the Roots of
Black Power (1999), Lance Hill’s The Deacons for Defense: Armed Resistance and the
Civil Rights Movement (2004), Christopher B. Strain’s Pure Fire: Self-Defense as
Activism in the Civil Rights Era (2005), and Simon Wendt’s The Spirit and the Shotgun
(2007). The historiography also contains significant works on the cultural side of Black
Power including William Van Deburg’s New Day in Babylon: The Black Power
Movement and American Culture, 1965-1975 (1992), Komozi Woodard’s A Nation
within a Nation: Amiri Baraka and Black Power Politics (1999), and Jeffrey Ogbar’s
Black Power: Radical Politics and African American Identity (2005). Van Deburg’s
work includes a significant section on black student revolts to create black studies
programs. To a lesser extent, Peniel Joseph’s general survey Waiting ‘Til the Midnight
Hour covers this subject as well.32
32
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This study of the University of Minnesota draws much more on the part of the
Black Power Movement which stresses culture and consciousness. The work of Van
Deburg and Joseph are particularly important in attaching Minnesota to the more general
trajectory of the larger Black Power Movement. While most of the black students at the
University of Minnesota advocated a right to self-defense, they did not take up arms.
Their leader, Rose Freeman, trained under Fannie Lou Hamer and participated in the
southern movement. While she took up the kind of black consciousness advocated by
figures in the Black Power Movement, she also sought to avoid violence, which was
more in keeping with the non-violent side of the Civil Rights Movement.
One also must examine the work on African Americans and civil rights in the
state of Minnesota. Here, the historiography is also quite limited. David Vassar Taylor’s
brief work African Americans in Minnesota (2002) represents the main general text on
the subject and devotes only one-half page to the Morrill Hall takeover.33 An excellent
work on the development of civil rights liberalism in Minnesota has been written. The
work of Jennifer Delton in Making Minnesota Liberal: Civil Rights and the
Transformation of the Democratic Party is driven by the question: why were white
Minnesotans interested in race? For Delton, the key to answering the question comes
through understanding a distinct Midwestern brand of liberalism developed by Hubert
Humphrey where local people voted on national issues and national platforms. Along
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side top-level politicians, the African American communities in Minnesota publicized
civil rights and tied liberals to national party politics.34
The history of the University appears in two volumes. The first was published by
James Gray in 1951. His book, The University of Minnesota 1851-1951, covered one
hundred years of the university’s history. More importantly, in 2001, Stanford Lehmberg
and Ann M. Pflaum published The University of Minnesota 1945-2000. A request for
research funds from 2001 point outs that this text “gives limited treatment to the complex
underlying forces involved.” They continue,
Little, if any, scholarly effort has been expended to explore and record the
history of African American involvement at the University and the takeover of Morrill Hall that led to the establishment of the aforementioned
programs…A qualitative assessment of the impact of African Americans
on the University during the latter part of the century has not been
attempted. The African American students who are presently enrolled at
the University of Minnesota have no memory of the take-over,
individually or collectively.35
While the document requests $115,000 for a research project which included funds for 50
oral interviews, the project never took place. However, their second initiative, a reunion,
did take place in 2006.36
Thus, the only book which gives the Morrill Hall takeover an extended treatment
is “Nerve Juice” and the Ivory Tower (2006) by Marie Braddock Williams, Rose Mary
Freeman Massey, and Horace Huntley.37 The three participated in the takeover and the
work can best be described as a memoir. While it contains information of historical value
which informs the present study, it lacks the qualities of a work of historical scholarship
34
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as there are no footnotes or endnotes, limited historical context, and only brief sections
analyzing the events. Neither this book nor any other examines the history of black
studies at Minnesota beyond the Morrill Hall takeover.
The long history of Minnesota’s Afro-American Studies Department and others
remains absent from the historiography. While some people have written about the
creation of black studies at the University of Minnesota and elsewhere, few have gone
beyond 1969. Fabio Rojas, a foremost historian of black studies, points out, “Movement
scholars have concluded that more needs to be said about the consequences and outcomes
of a social movement. Compared to the voluminous research on mobilization, the
literature on outcomes has yet to mature to a comparable level.”38 This leaves those
interested in black studies at the University of Minnesota and elsewhere wondering, “Can
the creation of black studies programs and departments be considered a long-term
success?”
In order to fully understand the events which took place at Morrill Hall and after,
one must examine the long history of black studies from its beginnings in the early 18th
century. This allows one to see the struggle of the Afro-American Action Committee
(AAAC) in Minnesota as part of a long-term strategy of resistance to white oppression by
way of studying the contributions and culture of African Americans who faced exclusion
in education as well as politics and social life. Russell L. Adams points out,
The proper place to begin to understand the nature of the contemporary
Black Studies movement is not the campus but the city, and the best place
to begin to understand the urban dimensions of the movement is not the
1960s but the years before…the Black Studies movement is but a
continuing aspect of our general battle for survival and liberation in a
fluctuatingly hostile environment, and that a part of what is seen today in
the Black Studies movement is but a fluctuation in a fight and an
38
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expression of black collective awareness dating back to the seedtime of
this nation.39
Lawrence Crouchett, in his work on early black studies movements, identifies the
beginning of black studies with secret teaching during slavery, hidden from white
masters. The first white-approved black studies organizations came from the Quakers as
early as 1713. These religious objectors to slavery wanted blacks to be equal and total
citizens. They taught African Americans their history so they could see their humiliation
and subjection in a system of forced servitude, travel as missionaries to Africa, and
resettle as freed slaves there.40
Meanwhile, Russell L. Adams divides his analysis of the history of black studies
into on-campus and off-campus black studies. He finds that off-campus black studies
began in New England with slaves who developed petitions for their manumission. In
doing so, they included studies of their conditions and character in a system of racial
servitude. Adams identifies the abolitionist David Walker’s Appeal to the Coloured
Citizens of the World as “the first black clearly political document that engendered a
direct response from the slavocracy.”41 It employed historical study to make its argument
that black people had suffered more than any other people in the world, among other
points. The work of Walker remains a landmark document as the first piece of black
studies scholarship.
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With the advent of Reconstruction, black history received a boost.42 The post-war
concern for educating black citizens appeared foremost in the creation of Lincoln
Schools. Loyal Leagues also provided education for many black politicians. Adams
identifies W.E.B. Du Bois as the founding father of on-campus black studies shortly after
Reconstruction.43 He and other pioneers of the field located the cause of problems
among African Americans in the institution of segregation, worked to reveal important
lines of ancestry, and tried to make black students capable participants in a democratic
society.44 In 1897, Du Bois taught the first black studies curriculum at Atlanta
University. At first, black studies simply meant a course in “Negro history.”45 In fact,
black history continues to stand at the center of black studies. Maulana Karenga
contends that black history remains “indispensable to the introduction and development
of all other subject areas. Black History places them in perspective, establishes their
origins and developments, and thus, aids in critical discussion and understanding of
them.”46
Numerous scholars also made attempts to create a black historical society
following Reconstruction, but they would not ultimately be successful until Woodson and
others organized the Association for the Study and Preservation of African American Life
and History in 1915 and the Journal of Negro History in 1916. To them, black studies
would foster racial pride and solidarity and combat prejudice and discrimination.47
Adams notes that Woodson kept his association separate from campus and remained at
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the forefront of off-campus black studies, though Woodson’s work served as the key
resource for on-campus black studies, exposing a gray area in Adams’ binary.48
In 1919, Woodson reported that Northern colleges began offering black studies
courses. His organization created and distributed the materials which made such courses
possible. The University of Minnesota was one of eight northern colleges listed as
offering a course, in this case, “The American Negro.” At the same time, Woodson
criticized many of these courses for being unproductive, arguing that they often became a
degrading discussion of the “menace of race” and an extended justification of “preventive
measures” taken by whites. Elsewhere, Garveyism offered a more productive impulse for
the study of African American history and culture by encouraging racial pride and
reverence for one’s ancestors.49
In a sped-up version of events, Lawrence Crouchett covers 40 years in two pages
noting that educational institutions in the 1920s remained slow in developing black
studies, but federal programs renewed interest during the Great Depression. By the mid1930s, southern black schools added black studies courses. However, black educators
and leaders abandoned black studies between 1940 and 1960.50 Similarly, Russell Adams
finds that black studies struggled against administrative hostility, philanthropic
opposition, and indifference on the part of many black faculty during the first four
decades of the 20th century.51
In his analysis, Crouchett argues that the rise of the contemporary Black Muslim
movement brought renewed study of black history and life. By the late 1950s, the call for
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black studies had increased. The movement for black studies courses and departments
spread from North to South, from colleges to secondary schools and then to the
elementary grades.52 Alternatively, Adams claims the Brown decision led to increased
attention on the black experience. He then points out that the death of Martin Luther
King, Jr. was the immediate catalyst for “the black student revolt” which called for,
among other things, more black studies courses on campus.53 In a third and slightly
different take, Peniel Joseph concludes that the modern black studies movement can trace
its immediate roots “in the depths of the Cold War that witnessed unprecedented and
unexpected black political radicalism.” Several converging phenomena contributed to
the radicalization of black students in the late 1960s: Third World liberation struggles,
the prominence of Malcolm X and, to a lesser extent, Robert F. Williams, close political
relationships with veteran activists, and the influence of revolutionary books and
journals.54
While there is little evidence that either the Black Muslim movement or the
Brown decision fueled the movement in Minneapolis, there is plenty of evidence that the
death of King spurred the Afro-American Action Committee to push for black studies at
the University of Minnesota. Though there is not much evidence that the AAAC talked
about Third World liberation struggles, they did read revolutionary books and journals.
While none of them practiced armed self-defense, they did bring at least one speaker to
campus who advocated bearing arms and did so while talking with the group. The
connection to veteran activists probably represented one of the strongest forces as the
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leader of the AAAC, Rose Mary Freeman, learned from and worked alongside Fannie
Lou Hamer.
Fabio Rojas argues that three conditions needed to be present for black studies to
emerge: disappointment with the Civil Rights Movement and unwillingness to wait for
white assistance which promoted radicalism, the rise of black nationalist groups, and
newly admitted black students on largely white campuses.55 The intensity of these forces
is revealed in the fact that, by 1970, this movement could cite 640 institutions which
offered courses in black studies, though only 65 granted an undergraduate degree in the
field.56 All three of Rojas’ conditions were present as Minnesota and they became one of
the institutions which create a black studies department.
The modern movement for black studies, as in earlier times, also required the
efforts of intellectuals. Harold Cruse wrote one of the key texts of the modern black
studies movement, The Crisis of the Negro Intellectual. He called for a
reconceptualization of black identity and focused on the role of black intellectuals in
achieving this task. Furthermore, he pointed out that black intellectuals and white
liberals engaged in an unequal relationship which prevented the creation of a discourse
on black liberation that went beyond the narrow confines of liberalism. The book was
well-received by younger African Americans who were angered by what they saw as
ineffective black leadership. This group felt they had to gain control of cultural
institutions that misrepresented black history and black people. They argued that
universities should strengthen institutions which made the black community viable and
raise the political consciousness of black students, which included an international

55
56

Rojas, 24.
Adams, 109-111.

26
perspective. Peniel Joseph argues, “Cruse’s works paved the way for an ideological
analysis of African and African American culture that would provide the building blocks
for the transformation of democracy in the U.S.”57
William Van Deburg dates the beginning of campus revolts, in general, with the
free speech controversy at Berkeley. He writes, “Once the demonstrators learned that
powerful institutions could be immobilized by expressive acts such as boycotts, sit-ins,
and the ‘liberation’ of administration buildings, there was no turning back. Through
militant self-expression, they had discovered the secret to student power.” This strategy
spread to groups advancing other issues like stopping the arms race, ending conscription
for the war in Vietnam, and creating black studies departments. The American Council
of Education conducted a study which found that, though they represented less that six
percent of all college students, black students were involved in 57 percent of all campus
protests in the 1968-1969 school year. Moreover, in 1967 and 1968, over 90 percent of
sit-ins instituted by black students occurred on college campuses rather than segregated
facilities in the surrounding communities.58
More specifically, according to Peniel Joseph, the modern black studies
movement began in 1967 at San Francisco State College when the school hired Amiri
Baraka and Sonia Sanchez as visiting professors.59 This program was a result of a black
student revolt. In fact, takeovers often formed a part of the movement for black studies,
which usually included violence. In the most well-publicized takeover at Cornell
University in 1969, black students occupied a building in an initially non-violent action.
However, the situation turned to armed self-defense when some students smuggled guns
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in to protect the group against drunken white students who attempted to takeover the
building.60
Not far from the University of Minnesota, at Wisconsin State-Oshkosh, black
students presented a list of demands and “ransacked” the presidential suite. The sheer
number of protesters arrested required that the city haul them away in Hertz rental trucks.
In the aftermath, the university expelled 90 of the 114 black students enrolled at the time.
Over at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, 2,100 National Guard troops carrying
rifles, tear gas, and machine guns were called in to control “the disorder.”61
Though a takeover took place in Minnesota and students engaged in self-defense,
guns and violence never became a part of the situation. Conversely, the takeover was not
as peaceful and “proper” as the one at Vassar College where students sat-in at Main Hall
and ended the demonstration by leaving a list of demands and two bouquets of yellow
daisies.62
While forming a part of a larger series of black student revolts, one must also be
conscious of the unique circumstances of African Americans in Minnesota. Thus, one
must consider the history of the black population there. Before World War II, the story is
largely one of a small, close-knit community without many connections to the struggles
of African Americans elsewhere in America. Minnesota’s African American population
remained quite small and isolated for many decades.63
While African Americans in Minnesota certainly made important contributions in
the 19th century, these events are sparsely documented. Certainly, the role of Dred Scott
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and his wife Harriet are widely recognized in Minnesota and national history. Scott spent
two years at Fort Snelling (1836-1838) in Minnesota, leading to a pivotal court case in
the Antebellum Era. During the Civil War, 104 black men served in Minnesota
regiments contributing to what became a struggle for black liberation. Shortly following
the war, the state legislature abolished segregation in Minnesota public schools.64
Between 1870 and 1890, the Twin Cities area (Minneapolis and St. Paul)
experienced a six-fold growth in the black population as a large number of mostly young
males from the upper South followed patterns of post-war migration to the North.65
Between 1910 and 1940, the black population only increased from 7,084 to 9,928. But,
in the next decade, it experienced a 41 percent increase growing to 14,022. Though,
black people still only made up one-half of one percent of the state’s total population.
The primary reasons for a perennially small black population lay in the lack of available
jobs due to a small industrial base as well as discriminatory hiring practices in those
businesses that existed. While black people experienced discrimination in stores and
were barred from neighborhoods by whites who formed restrictive covenants, the
hardest-hitting form of discrimination could be found in employment.66
Though racial violence remained rare in Minnesota, it still occurred in vicious
forms. The most shocking instance took place in Duluth in 1920 when a mob assaulted
three black circus workers. They held a mock trial in the street accusing the three of
assaulting a local white girl. Then, they hung the three black men from lampposts. Much
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like lynching elsewhere, eighteen members of the mob faced indictments for murder and
rioting, but only two were found guilty of rioting and none of murder.67
Minnesota also witnessed a housing confrontation similar to that of the wellknown Dr. Ossian Sweet. In July, 1931, a black World War I veteran attempted to move
into an all-white neighborhood. Four thousand whites angrily besieged his home hurling
stones at it for four days. In an attempt to resolve the crisis the only way they knew how,
civic leaders convinced the veteran to sell his home. However, there is speculation that
he moved elsewhere in the same neighborhood.68
Like blacks elsewhere, African Americans rejected the passivity of victimhood.
Instead, they fought back against discrimination. In 1898, Attorney Frank Wheaton won
a seat in the state house and penned a law which banned discrimination in bars. In other
legal landmarks, J. Louis Ervin, a black lawyer, won acquittal for his black client accused
of murdering a white man in 1917, a rarity for the time. These political and legal
activities combined with organizing. Community members founded NAACP chapters in
St. Paul in 1913 and Minneapolis the following year. These organizations mobilized to
successfully eliminate racial identification in crime reporting and protest the showing of
D.W. Griffith’s heroic tale of the Klan, Birth of a Nation. At the same time, due to the
small African American population, these chapters possessed few resources and counted
few members.69
Until World War II, the interests of most African Americans in Minnesota
remained parochial. But, the upheaval of war mobilization increased black Minnesotans
identification with the larger African American freedom movement. Local newspapers
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placed municipal activities in a larger, grand narrative about civil rights across the United
States. Moreover, protests rose as the local black community embraced the nationwide
idea of double victory.70
Progress in civil rights continued following the war. In 1945, Hubert Humphrey
won the election for mayor of Minneapolis. Civil rights became a central priority of his
administration with the creation of a Council on Human Relations (CHR) and a Fair
Employment Practices Commission (FEPC). This made the city one of only a few
municipalities country-wide to enforce non-discrimination with regard to employment.
But, the Council on Human Relations went beyond employment. This privately-funded
government group researched racial and religious discrimination, educated the public,
monitored the media for racist content, and investigated some individual cases of
discrimination.71
All this time, the population of black people in Minnesota continued to remain a
small percentage of the whole. Regardless, demographics were not the key factor in
Minnesotans’ acceptance of black civil rights. Jennifer Delton writes, “Historians
attribute the emergence of race in northern politics to the sudden wartime influx of black
migrants into northern cities, which led to economic competition, housing conflicts, new
voters, violence, and shifts in political power. But Minnesota experienced no great
increase in its black population during the war. It experienced no race riots, no new
influx of voters to be courted. Nonetheless, Minnesotans made racism and civil rights a
political issue.72 She elaborates,
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Those Minnesotans who identified racism as a problem did so for the same
reasons other Americans embraced antiracism during World War II: a
sense of right and wrong, the paradox of fighting for democracy while
twelve million citizens were denied basic democratic rights, the migration
of black Americans out of the South, where they could not vote, to the
North, where they could, fear of racial strife, and African American
activism. These reasons motivated many Minnesotans to organize
seminars and workshops about racism and religious prejudice, to study the
racial situation in Minnesota, and to prohibit racial discrimination.73
Between 1950 and 1970, the pinnacle years of the civil rights and black power
movements, Minneapolis and St. Paul both registered a roughly 400% increase in their
African American populations. Most of the increase came from migrants from the South
and North-Central states.74 Though Delton notes that Minnesota experienced no “race
riots” in the immediate post-World War II period, civil disorder did break out in the Twin
Cities in 1968. David Vassar Taylor writes,
The outbreak of civil disorder in the Twin Cities on Labor Day weekend
in 1968 was influenced by national events. Upset over intractable
unemployment, discrimination in housing, and other forms of
discriminatory behaviors, some blacks lost patience with the slow pace
towards socioeconomic and political equality. Although the extent of
local rioting never reached the levels experienced in Detroit, Newark, the
Watts area of Los Angeles, Celveland, or New York, it produced
thousands of dollars in property damage and scores of personal injuries.
The civil unrest of the 1960s helped to underscore the disparity in
opportunity accorded to black Minnesotans.75
Taylor specifically connects this civil disorder caused by disparity in opportunities to the
Morrill Hall takeover, which was a forceful reaction to educational disparities.
In fact, the history of African Americans who attended the University of
Minnesota is embedded in this larger history of black communities in the state. When
more black men and women came to the University in the 1920s, the almost entirely
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white campus focused on creating separate spaces and segregated communities for
African Americans. Though World War II brought the possibility of increased
integration, segregation continued. In 1948, the Office of the Dean of Students
conducted a survey which found that 27 student organizations, mostly fraternities and
sororities, included restrictive clauses in their by-laws which prohibited “Negroes” from
joining. Similarly, the University continued asking its approved roster of landlords to list
religious and racial preferences for renters up until 1950 when it bowed to pressure from
the NAACP.76
The university became slightly more diverse in 1958. Coach Murray Warmath
and university alumnus, journalist and later Deputy Secretary of State and delegate to the
United Nations for the Kennedy Administration Carl Rowan took the initiative to recruit
African American players, making Minnesota one of the first major universities to do
so.77 Beyond that, during the years of civil rights activism of the 1950s and 1960s in
America, a group formed on the University campus called Freedom Minnesota. The
group held numerous conversations about sit-ins. However, given that African
Americans still formed a small and isolated group and tended to live off-campus, they
kept a low profile. In fact, a student in the mid-1960s and later professor, David Vassar
Taylor noted that he would go days without seeing another black student. Though,
getting a precise count on the African American population remained an ongoing
problem.78
In the early 1960s, political science professor Mulford Q. Sibley influenced
numerous students to become involved in progressive and radical movements. Sibley
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was a Quaker, and therefore pacifist, who held political views many regarded as radical.
People also described him as “the unofficial conscience of the university” and “a Quaker
saint.” One of his students, Zev Aelony, pointed to Sibley as a key influence in his
participation in non-violent civil rights protests in Georgia in 1963 and 1964. Aelony
helped organize Students for Integration at the University of Minnesota.79
Beyond just Professor Sibley, Walter Mondale stated that, “Faculty [he may have
meant alumni] came off the campus totally committed to reform, internationalism, and
civil rights. They did more per capita than any state in the union on civil rights.” He
pointed to the strong record of University of Minnesota graduates: Roy Wilkins became
President of the NAACP, Whitney Young led the Urban League, and Carl Rowan worked
in the Kennedy Administration.80
The Civil Rights Movement on predominantly white, northern campuses made a
significant advance in 1964 when the Big Ten Universities met in Racine, Wisconsin, for
the “Third Inter-University Conference on the Negro.” Attendees urged universities to
commit increased resources to aiding impoverished and minority students. On May 19,
1964, University President O. Meredith Wilson appointed Professor David Cooperman,
who attended that conference, to head up a committee on “The Role of the University in
Social Problems.” He charged the group, also referred to as the Cooperman Committee,
to: identify programs, people and agencies in the University engaged in instruction and
research related to the broad area of social policy; indicate social policy changes which
should be made; and indicate programs which could form a base of inter-institutional
cooperation.
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In its report, the committee noted that it concerned itself mostly with minority
group relations and education for African Americans and American Indians. The
Cooperman Report called for a Community Program Center that would increase
involvement of the University with local communities and their problems. The Center
would utilize University resources to take action to improve the surrounding city. It also
called for increased enrollment of African American and American Indian students. To
do so, the committee recommended dealing with “inadequate preparation of
disadvantaged minority group members” and increased sensitivity “to non-white majority
apperceptions of the educational process.” The authors concluded by warning that if such
action was not forthcoming, criticism of the University’s lack of action on these pressing
problems would increase.81 This conclusion proved quite prescient.
Shortly after the release of the Cooperman Report, President Wilson appointed
another committee, in December 1965, headed by Professor Warren Cheston, to consider
the same questions on a broader basis. The Cheston Committee released a report on July
8, 1966, calling for the establishment of a center for urban and regional affairs. The first
task of the center would be creating programs for teaching, research, and service relating
to the urban and regional community. This Center for Urban and Regional Affairs
(CURA), or Community Program Center (CPC), was approved by the Board of Regents
in September, but did not have a director until the following year. On July 14, 1967,
Professor Fred Lukermann became Assistant Vice President for Academic
Administration and received assignment to serve as acting director of the new center.
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The center was set to begin extension and continuing-education work with $120,000
approved by the legislature in 1967 for the project.82
Though it possessed funding, the center lacked a permanent director. Lukermann
began searching for a permanent director upon his appointment, but it came to an
unfruitful ending. So, in the spring of 1968, Professors David Cooperman and Gisela
Konopka were appointed to the center to implement one aspect of the program.
However, they found themselves unable to begin their work until July of 1968. Finally,
on August 1, 1968, Professor John Borchert of the Geography Department was named
permanent director.83 The details of this process are not essential to understanding the
creation of a black studies department. Rather, one essential point arises from a brief
overview of this process: changes in the University bureaucracy were slow and tedious.
The University also employed other programs to reach out to disadvantaged
students. The New Careers program connected the University with community agencies
and individuals. While incorporating a significant number of minority students, it
primarily targeted an older population. Another program, Upward Bound, connected
with disadvantaged students while still in high school to prepare them for college.
Finally, the University offered a program called Higher Education for Low-Income
People (HELP).84 After the take-over, the CURA worked closely with the Martin Luther
King Program and HELP. It sponsored scholarly studies for urban issues and community
outreach programs.85 As the Investigating Commission of the Morrill Hall incident
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noted, these programs did not materialize as quickly as many had hoped.86 The slow
pace of change and bureaucratic hurdles blocking the creation of new programs would
become recurring themes as black students organized to improve the university.
In the late 1960s, the Black Freedom Struggle really began to take hold of the
University of Minnesota campus. Tim Brady writes, “The powerful legacy of Malcolm
X, the emerging Black Panther movement, and a growing acknowledgement—
culminating in the urban riots of the mid-1960s—that racism was not isolated to southern
states led to an escalating tension that was felt deeply on the campus of the University of
Minnesota.”87 The Investigating Commission of the Morrill Hall Incident attempted to
contextualize the event in the rise of student protest. They noted that the 1967-68 school
year saw 147 “incidents” involving a wide range of issues on campuses nationwide.
One-third were racial in nature.88
Most of these “racial incidents” at the University of Minnesota could probably be
attributed to Students for Racial Progress (STRAP) which organized in the 1966-1967
school year. Its leadership included Bill Wilson, who later became the director of the
Minnesota State Department of Human Rights. Much like other black student unions
across the country, STRAP focused on the admission of more black students, curriculum
reform, hiring of black faculty and staff, and sharing resources with the local community.
The organization sponsored political forums featuring black power speakers which
brought Stokely Carmichael (Kwame Ture) to campus in 1967. When it became the
Afro-American Action Committee (AAAC), they continued this tradition by inviting Dr.
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Herman Dillard, a medical doctor who graduated with honors from the University of
Minnesota. He came to the University with two guns strapped at his sides.89
STRAP also organized a silent sit-in in the fall of 1967. The immediate cause of
the sit-in was that Ida Elam, the president of STRAP, failed to receive an invitation to the
fall convocation. But, it also resulted from long-term frustrations with the isolation of
black students on campus and the lack of respect shown to them by the University. So, in
response, STRAP occupied the front aisle of Northrop Auditorium for the convocation
program, remaining silent. After that, they gave speeches in the plaza outside the
auditorium.90 Like student groups elsewhere, STRAP employed the strategy of visibly
taking an area which impeded the smooth functioning of an organization or event. This
tactic would be employed to great effect later in the Morrill Hall takeover.
In 1967, STRAP became the Afro-American Action Committee (AAAC). Horace
Huntley says that the name change more specifically articulated the organization’s goals.
It made clear that the students were not just a “miscellaneous collection of activists,” but
a group of Afro-American students working for change. Moreover, the group decided
that they were not fighting for racial progress, but the survival of black people and the
triumph of freedom.91 Beyond that, David Vassar Taylor contends that the AAAC made
the movement more focused on specific goals rather than “non-directional.”92 While
there was no religious disposition to the AAAC, the various people brought their own
faith backgrounds to the movement. Marie Braddock Williams says, “God’s gift was
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stirred up in us, for this was not only a struggle for equality and justice, but also a faith
movement that was going to move mountains.”93
The writings of Frantz Fanon, Che Guevara, Malcolm X, Stokely Carmichael and
Charles V. Hamilton, Kwame Nkrumah, George Jackson, and Mao Tse Tung influenced
the leaders of the AAAC.94 The texts the students identified most with were particularly
important as they helped inculcate the black power concsciousness which remained
central to the group. This ideology, placed in the context of a college campus, produced
ideas for programs like black studies and increased minority recruitment. As Fabio Rojas
observes,
Black students did not develop the black studies proposal ex nihilo. The
melding of nationalist ideologies with the college curriculum of the mid1960s shows how activists create institutional alternatives by combining
different elements from their organizational environment. Students
created the black studies courses by infusing previously existing
educational practices with new meanings.95
He also finds that Black Nationalism delegitimized traditional authority in the minds of
its adherents. For black students, this meant that if they felt the college administration or
faculty acted unjustly, they felt obligated to remedy the situation by taking forceful and
visible action.96 To some groups this meant violence. For example, members of the
Black Student Union set nine bombs and detonated four on the campus of San Francisco
State College.97 But, the situation in Minnesota never reached the point of violence.
Horace Huntley notes that some in the AAAC believed in violence and some
believed in non-violence. The group was not a monolith. However, they all agreed that
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they must change the status quo. To them, black power meant standing up to the
indignities of racism and ridding society of white supremacy. Like Frederick Douglass,
Martin Luther King, Jr., and Malcolm X, they recognized that education played a key part
in realizing this dream.98
In their history, The University of Minnesota 1945-2000, Ann Pflaum and
Stanford Lehmberg say that the Afro-American Action Committee was formed with
community representatives.99 However, the AAAC was a distinctly student group.
Horace Huntley points out that many people have misunderstood the relationship
between the university and the community. While the students had connections to the
community, they did not count community members among those in their group.100
As a student group, many considered the AAAC the voice of black people on the
University of Minnesota-Twin Cities campus. The group stated that its purpose was to,
“present a realistic view of the American Negro in relation to his cultural and social
heritage with emphasis on the academic community; to provide a forum by which
students may initiate programs to eliminate racial discrimination in all areas of concern;
to provide the necessary leadership within the Negro community and to bring about a
better understanding among all Americans.” Many black students agreed with this
proposition as the AAAC’s membership remained between 50 and 60 students since its
inception, an overwhelming majority of those on campus.101 The AAAC formed part of a
larger trend across the country where black student unions offered the primary vehicle for
black power protests. Most of these organizations focused on two goals: increasing
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political activism among black collegians and promoting black cultural expression.102
The AAAC set their sights primarily on the former.
Horace Huntley writes,
The AAAC demands were not simply for a curriculum in Black Studies,
but for the development of a mentality that challenged the benign White
supremacist’s status quo. We were not in school to just get an education
that afforded us a good job. We demanded an education that prepared us
in the development of skills that taught us how to think from a Black
perspective, and to put that though into actions that benefited our
communities. We refused to settle for an institution that educated us away
from our people and made us part of the problem, rather than the vanguard
of solution.103
In writing this, Huntley highlights the role of black consciousness, one of the various
manifestations of black power, in creating black studies departments and being passed on
through them. William Van Deburg contextualizes this, saying, “If knowledge was
power, then institutions of higher learning were academic jousting fields upon which key
societal power relationships were decided. For the student protesters, greater control over
their learning environment was vitally essential to the larger struggle for self-definition
and power.” Attending a white university also offered a learning experience in dealing
with white majoritarian institutions. The knowledge black students gained in the struggle
there could be used in the larger quest for black liberation.104
The Investigating Commission of the Morrill Hall Incident noted, in the Winter
Quarter of 1968-1969, the university enrolled 39,202 students of which not more that 1%
were black.105 Meanwhile, the Minneapolis Tribune said there were fewer than 250 black
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students among the 41,000 students on the campus.106 Finally, the leaders of the AAAC
claimed there were exactly 87 black students out of 47,000.107 Given the lack of accurate
data, one cannot be sure how many African American students attended the university,
but one can be sure the number registered quite low.
Though the enrollment of African Americans remained low, it was increasing as
part of a more general trend of black students attending majority white campuses.
Nationwide, in 1964, there were 234,000 black college students, 51 percent of whom
attended historically black colleges. By 1970, one-half million black students were
attending college, with 66 percent of them at predominantly white colleges.108
Besides the creation of the AAAC, 1967 also saw the arrival of Marie Braddock
(later Marie Braddock Williams) at the University of Minnesota. She came a short way
from St. Paul, Minnesota, and became the Secretary of the AAAC, an important figure in
the Morrill Hall takeover, and later co-wrote “Nerve Juice.” Williams also became
involved with the Inner City Youth League and the Hallie Q. Brown Community Center
which was a part of the Martin Luther King Center in St. Paul. Williams felt connected
to the local black community because she grew up there and continued to work with local
organizations. However, she did not feel much community support on campus until after
the Morrill Hall takeover, which again challenges Pflaum and Lehmberg’s claim that the
AAAC was a student-community organization. Through the Morrill Hall takeover, she
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also met people from The Way in North Minneapolis.109 The nexus between the
community and university would become a central theme in later years.
Williams did not wish to attend college after graduating from high school.110 No
one at St. Paul Central, the high school she graduated from in 1967, talked to her or other
black students about higher education. The staff, which included only one black teacher,
did not inform black students about opportunities or scholarships. As a result, she
remembers feeling ill-prepared and “out there on her own” with regard to education.111
However, her parents put pressure on her to follow in her sister’s footsteps and she
enrolled in the University of Minnesota’s General College in the fall.
Williams became a member of STRAP and when it was changed to the AAAC
she became secretary of that organization. Her decision to get involved in the movement
was supported by her parents. She wrote, “It was time for a change. It was time to take a
stand to make things fairer for all students, but especially for Black students. It was time
for me to attend classes where students and professors looked like me. It was time, it was
our time, and we seized the moment. AAAC was the instrument.”112
Meanwhile, Rose Mary Freeman (later Rose Mary Freeman Massey) arrived in
Minnesota earlier, in 1965. In 1967, she also began attending the University of
Minnesota.113 She originally came from Mississippi and grew up in the all-black
community of Browning, founded after the Civil War by a group of ex-slaves. Freeman
recalls 1955 when Emmett Till was murdered 10 miles away from her community. The
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men gathered to discuss how they were going to protect their families and property from
attack. For several days, the community remained in a state of high tension and kept
guards posted waiting for attackers.114
Possessing a familiarity with racist violence and armed self-defense, Freeman
participated in the Civil Rights Movement and worked for the Council of Federated
Organizations (COFO) for a year in the 1960s.115 She was not afraid of speaking out,
having been jailed a number of times for such action. At seventeen years of age, Rose
traveled to the Carolinas to a workshop with Fannie Lou Hamer. Her first arrest came
shortly thereafter when she participated in a sit-in at a lunch counter in Montgomery
County, Mississippi. Though she was “banged around” in jail, she did not feel the brunt
of the violence. Instead, the guards ordered her to clean the blood off of her friend June
Johnson’s dress. Fannie Lou Hamer received the harshest treatment.116
In late 1963 and 1964, Rose worked on the Greenwood SNCC Project. She
convinced people to register to vote and took them to become political participants.
Initially, her job was very difficult. But, more and more people became willing to take
the risk of engaging in the political process. While working on the SNCC project, Rose
met Rachel Tilsen from the Twin Cities. Rachel told Rose if she ever wanted to attend
college, she should consider coming North to the University of Minnesota.117
In Minneapolis, Freeman continued working for the advancement of black
communities at The Way Unlimited, Inc. in North Minneapolis.118 At the time of the
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takeover, she held the office of President of the AAAC.119 Horace Huntley notes that as
an organizer in Mississippi and an understudy of Fannie Lou Hamer, Rose was the most
qualified to lead the group. Though she was a female leader of a black power
organization, that was nothing new at the university where another woman from the
Greenwood area had led STRAP before I t became the AAAC. Horace Huntley recalls
no problems with gender within the group.120
Like Rose Freeman, Horace Huntley also came from the Deep South. He traveled
from Birmingham, Alabama, and arrived in Minnesota after serving in the United States
military. Originally, he planned on attending the Tuskegee Institute, but his family could
not afford to send him. So, he joined the United States Air Force and served for almost
four years. During that time, he received assignment to the Grand Forks Air Force Base
in North Dakota, a state which had a black population of 333.
In May of 1963, after reading about the events in his hometown of Birmingham,
Huntley applied for leave to go join the movement and informed his superiors he was
leaving whether it was approved or not.121 But, Huntley did not participate in the
movement upon arriving there. Rather, he remained on the sidelines and observed.122
Rose Freeman Massey wrote of him, “[He was] not born to be a leader, but chosen out of
circumstances that were beyond his control, and driven by a strong sense of what was
right and what was wrong.”123
Huntley initially planned to spend 20 years in the military. But, his experience in
the military, including being stationed in North Dakota, led him to decide that he would
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not make it a career. After working with keypunch machines and computers in the Air
Force, he decided to pursue a degree in computer technology and went to Minneapolis
after being discharged in 1965.
While there, he developed connections with the Sabathani Community Center in
South Minneapolis, an organization founded by militant community activists. Part of his
reason for working with the community center was the lack of community on the
Minnesota campus. Compared to the South, Huntley felt that black people would not
speak to or acknowledge each other at the University of Minnesota. He believed they
ignored the black connection and denied their African descent.124 John Wright, a
professor at the University of Minnesota, notes the importance of the town-grown
connection to the increased politicization of black students on campus. He says that
black students found encouragement and support through community organizations like
the Urban League, and the Phyllis Wheatley, Hallie Q. Brown, and The Way community
centers.125 At The Way, Horace met Mahmoud El-Kati, an expert in black history. ElKati sparked Huntley’s interest in African American history encouraged him to read
works by authors like Frederick Douglass and John Hope Franklin. At this point,
Huntley says he was intellectually preparing himself to participate in the movement.126
His readings in black history through people he met at the way filled a significant
gap in his education at the University of Minnesota. Huntley found his education at the
university lacking in acknowledgement of the experience of African Americans. He
remembers taking a course in American History at the university with a notable
professor. One day, the professor took ten minutes to cover the entirety of African
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American history. Horace raised his hand and asked if the professor was going to say
anything more about the black experience in the course. The professor condescendingly
answered, “Well, is there more?” Instances like this compelled Huntley to get involved
with the AAAC to encourage the university to accept a broader range of study.127 At the
time of the takeover, Huntley chaired the planning committee for the black conference.128
The connection to the community remained important for black student unions
everywhere. Students’ lists of demands frequently asked for projects to aid the black
community. William Van Deburg finds,
The students could help community residents purge themselves of the
sociocultural misinformation that they had imbibed all of their lives. On
the other hand, continual interaction with local residents would assure the
students that they were not straying too far from the nurturing ethic of
black community life—that they were remaining close to the very
wellspring of Afro-American culture.129
Black students often took their first black studies course in the form of an offcampus study group. For instance, the creation of Malcolm X Liberation University in
Durham influenced the creation of black studies programs at North Carolina Central
University and Duke University. Black students became more involved in the
community and with non-academic African Americans on campus.130 Similarly, Horace
Huntley’s first involvement with black studies was at The Way community organization,
rather than at the University of Minnesota.
The Afro-American Action Committee, among other black student unions, seems
to mark the beginning of their activities to create a black studies department at the
University of Minnesota campus with the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. on
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April 4, 1968.131 However, they were not the first group to respond. The following day,
the Minnesota Student Association (MSA) began organizing to set up a fund to provide
free tuition to poor students. The MSA acted as the student government since 1959 when
it replaced the All University Congress. The University considered the MSA President
the representative voice of the student body on most issues and offered him or her ready
access to most administrative, faculty and student councils.132
Similarly, an ad hoc faculty group calling themselves The Committee of Fifty met
to set up a Memorial Fund following the assassination. They sent letters to other faculty
in search of donations. Another group of professors created a proposal much like the
MSA’s which requested free tuition for poor people. Furthermore, University President
Malcolm Moos asked Vice President Paul Cashman to set up a task force on human
rights.133 The task force later included eleven faculty, ten students, and four members of
the community.134 Many groups responded to the assassination showing a disposition for
improving race relations on campus before the AAAC took action.
Malcolm Moos, the President of the University who created the task force, came
from a conservative background. He attended the University of Minnesota to earn his
bachelor’s and master’s degrees before moving to Los Angeles to complete his doctorate
at the University of California. He taught at four universities and later published the
book The Campus and the State (1959) about the intersection of educational institutions
and government. Moos’ history of the Republican Party found its way to Dwight
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Eisenhower and in 1957, Moos became his chief speechwriter penning the famous
“military-industrial complex” address. Moos then wrote speeches for other notable
politicians before joining the Ford Foundation in 1964, an organization that would
become a key source of funds for black studies programs and departments.135
Upon taking over the presidency at the University of Minnesota in 1967, Malcolm
Moos listed his goals for the campus. The Dean of the College of Liberal Arts at the
University of Minnesota at the beginning of Moos’ tenure, E.W. Ziebarth, later said that
Moos “tried to be helpful in the Eisenhower administration in converting the president of
the United States to a more sympathetic view of black problems.” One of his top
priorities upon arriving at the university was creating a strong partnership between the
campus and the surrounding community.136 This would become a special concern of the
Afro-American Studies Department upon its inception. Beyond that, Moos wanted to
resolve conflicts between students and the administration. He took over the presidency at
a time when campus unrest throughout the country was reaching a peak. He noted the
challenge this would present during his tenure by saying, “The towering issue today, at
least for the student activist on campus, is power.”137
Three days after the president’s request for a task force, the Afro-American
Action Committee presented him with seven demands at a mass rally they organized.
These included: 200 full scholarships for black Minnesota high school students,
consideration of the proposal to eliminate tuition for underprivileged black high school
students, guidance counseling and recruitment agencies geared towards black students, a
board of review to examine the policies of the Athletic Department towards black
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athletes, serious consideration of the possibility of naming the new West Bank library
after Dr. King, representation of black students on all major university policy-making
groups, and a curriculum which reflected the contributions of black people to America.
Moos was in attendance at the rally and addressed them in response to their demands. In
essence, he stated that the demands seemed reasonable.138
Following the AAAC rally, the Task Force on Human Rights held public
meetings to address complaints, dissatisfaction, and suggestions concerning the situation
of disadvantaged students. Members of the AAAC attended meetings and participated in
discussions concerning the University’s relationship to poor and minority groups.139
Cashman’s Task Force on Human Rights responded to the seven demands by stating that
the group would concentrate on the request regarding recruitment. The following month,
the Task Force recommended that the university set up 200 full-term financial awards for
disadvantaged students, begin a recruitment program, provide staff cooperation for a
campaign to obtain money for the Martin Luther King Fund, and provide counseling and
tutorial programs.140 This tutorial program later faced problems as it set minority
students apart and a stigma became attached to being a Martin Luther King Scholar.141
By the end of the Spring Quarter, the Task Force recessed after attempting
recruitment in only three St. Paul schools. While some recruitment occurred over the
summer, it often lacked coordination and effectiveness. Meanwhile, the board of the
Martin Luther King Fund decided to supplement the one-third grant from the University
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to allow disadvantaged students full grant assistance.142 This decision later turned
problematic as the fund fell short on money and students suffered the consequences. The
recess at the end of spring was equally troublesome. The chairman later recognized this
may have been a mistake as the group lost momentum in recruitment and other goals over
the summer and never recovered.143
When the Task Force resumed sessions in the fall, they became preoccupied with
the employment of minority workers on university construction contracts instead of
looking at new curricula which would be more inclusive of minority communities.
During this time, the AAAC frequently missed meetings because the gatherings lacked
discussion about moving programs like black studies forward. Interestingly, the Students
for a Democratic Society (SDS) consistently pushed the Task Force to become
preoccupied with the construction issue which negatively affected the AAAC’s areas of
concern, though the AAAC later welcomed them to participate peripherally in the Morrill
Hall takeover. It was not until December that proposals on black studies again came
under discussion by the Task Force.144
The Task Force held several winter sessions to examine the curriculum offerings
already available which could fall under black studies. The College of Liberal Arts
(CLA) Intermediary Board compiled a list of courses and recommended instituting a
partial program in African Studies and a degree program in Afro-American Studies based
around classes already being taught. Professor Frank Wood worked on developing a
program in Afro-American Studies and sent a memorandum setting forth the progress of
a committee he led on developing courses for the program. However, the chairman of the
142
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Task Force recognized that there would be little or no progress towards a degree program
in African American studies in the 1968-1969 school year.145
Despite this, in the fall of 1968, the Task Force recommended that the university
faculty and students encourage the expansion of content on minority group cultures and
human relations, increase information about these course offerings, raise the availability
of these offerings, and boost the effectiveness of instruction. The Task Force determined
that enough courses existed to allow the creation of inter-disciplinary majors in the area
of comparative minority cross-cultural and human relations studies. An inter-disciplinary
faculty and student committee organized to create a proposal for a graduate program in
comparative racial and ethnic studies. However, to the AAAC, this planning seemed
focused on the wrong area of the college. As the Investigating Commission noted, a
large percentage of black students were enrolled in the General College, a two-year
college at the University. But, most of the planning for courses in black studies took
place at the graduate level and in the College of Liberal Arts, a part of the University with
entrance requirements that made it difficult to transfer into from the General College.146
Meanwhile, on December 11, 1968, the issue of minority grants arose again.
When students awarded those grants went to pick them up, they received notification that
the Martin Luther King Fund lacked money. Instead of accepting grants, the students
now required loans to pay tuition.147 Many students experienced confusion and
dissatisfaction, to put it delicately, at finding the grants they expected to receive
unavailable.148
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A similar problem occurred in the fall of 1968 at the University of Illinois. The
university created a set of scholarships following the assassination of Martin Luther
King, Jr., called the Equal Educational Opportunities Program (EEOP). Over the
summer, the university’s black student union recruited 550 black students to take part in
the program. However, the administration only raised money to support a maximum of
300 students. Moreover, many personnel in the registrar’s office went on extended
vacations over the summer preventing the office from processing applications for the
newly recruited students. Given the high number of students without housing or funds to
secure temporary housing, the students occupied a building, causing some destruction.
The police were quickly called in and they jailed 244 black students on charges including
malicious destruction of property and illegal occupancy of public property.149
Also in December, the AAAC decided to seek financial support for a black
conference to be held at the university in mid-February. On December 5, Rose Mary
Freeman and Horace Huntley met with President Moos, Vice President Cashman, and
other University staff to acquire financial support for the black conference to be held in
February. President Moos informed them that public funds could not be used for such an
event, but he would aid the group in seeking private funding. Vice President Cashman
appointed Dr. Donald Zanger, Director of the University Unions, to work with the AAAC
on organizing and finding outside support for the conference. Specifically, Zander
worked on finding accommodations for visitors and raising funds.150
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Events at this time were not moving in the direction or at the pace that the AAAC
wished. Programs rather than departments were being developed and forming in the
wrong areas of the college. Students lost out on the grants the university promised them
during recruitment. The black conference lacked the funding students hoped the
university would provide. Prospects for a degree program in the present school year
looked dim and the students pushing for it increasingly felt they would never get to enroll
in black studies courses given the slow pace of change. Frustrated by intransigent task
forces and an administration that would listen but not expedite change, the AAAC took
action, as their name indicated they would.

54
Chapter 2: “Taking on the Dragon in the Streets of Babylon”: The Morrill Hall
Takeover of 1969

In From Black Power to Black Studies, Fabio Rojas argues that protests were not
carried out with the intention of forming a department of black studies, but created the
opportunities for a later time. Instead, groups usually requested black housing and
increased black enrollment. Moreover, community members used the campus as a stage
for voicing concerns about the ways in which universities ignored or hampered the
development of the neighborhoods in which they were located. Rojas points to the
University of Chicago where black students occupied an administration building to
demand all-black housing. Following that, a committee was created where black students
presented a request for a black studies program. At the University of Illinois-Chicago,
during an anti-war building occupation, fights broke out between black and white
students. Following the takeover, the university created a commission to hear complaints
from black students and one of the grievances concerned the lack of a black studies
department.151
Alternatively, at the University of Minnesota, the central demand during the
Morrill Hall takeover was the creation of a black studies program. There was no issue
which served as a pretext to a later request for an Afro-American Studies Department.
Moreover, the movement at the Twin Cities campus was a distinctly student movement
with community members only involved in a limited consulting role. This chapter offers
a detailed account of the takeover with points of comparison to and analysis of other
incidents as well as synthetic works.
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The account of the Morrill Hall takeover lies primarily in three sources. The first
is the official report of the University of Minnesota. The Investigating Commission on
the Morrill Hall Incident produced this document. This investigating commission created
by University President Malcolm Moos on January 20, 1969, included three members of
the community, four faculty members, three students, and two administrators. Moos gave
them the responsibility for investigating the facts, but not determining the guilt or
innocence of the people involved. The commission held 22 closed meetings lasting over
70 hours which included calling witnesses to appear voluntarily.152 However, this report
became the subject of criticism from the AAAC. To balance problems with its bias,
points of dispute have been noted. The other two accounts, created by the Liberation
Coalition in early 1969 and by Williams, Freeman and Huntley in “Nerve Juice” (2006)
are also included in the narrative to provide a more detailed account of the events and
challenge the dominant narrative.
Though the university made some effort, by mid-January, 1969, the AfroAmerican Action Committee felt little progress had been made on their demands which
they had issued almost a year ago. The AAAC faced the bureaucratic hurdles of a large
university which tended to hinder the pace of progress. This daunting administrative
structure coupled with the use of task forces and special commissions to solve specific
problems meant anyone seeking change required extreme patience.153
Similar conditions were present at San Francisco State College, the site of one of
the most famous and studied black student revolts. Black students there made up only
four percent of the population on campus. They were also seeking a black studies
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department and a plan for the university to increase minority enrollment. Though the
college agreed to the students’ demand for a black studies department in 1966, the
administration at San Francisco spent two years developing the proposal and hiring staff.
The students faced bureaucratic hurdles as administrators kept changing deadlines and
rules regarding the needed paperwork for the department. Moreover, the administration
refused to ask for extra money from the legislature and other departments were unwilling
to cooperate with the creation of a black studies department.154 So, like Minnesota,
though the administration stated their intention to create a department, the slow pace of
change combined with bureaucratic blockades led to a student revolt.
On January 13, 1969, seven black representatives of the AAAC at the University
of Minnesota entered the Office of the President to meet with him. With the president
away at a meeting in Duluth, Vice President Cashman met to talk with the students along
with Assistant Vice President Lukermann, Mr. Reeves, and Mr. Learn.155 The students
voiced primary concern with their financial aid difficulties as the university changed their
grants to loans. Secondly, the AAAC expressed frustration about the slow progress in
obtaining funding for a proposed black conference. They felt they had been promised
full support earlier and had not received it. Cashman referred them to an earlier meeting
where the administration informed the AAAC that they needed to provide a budget
before headway could be made on financing the conference. Finally, the students
expressed a desire for an Afro-American Studies Department and asked why the
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university did not employ Milt Williams (Mahmoud El-Kati), who would later become an
important and controversial figure at the university.156
The meeting took place in a tense environment. In reporting to the Investigating
Commission, Vice President Cashman noted at one point someone suggested
“entrapment.” One student stood guarding one door and two students stood blocking the
other. Someone asked the reporter for the Minnesota Daily to leave. Though a student
suggested holding him there until he met their demands, Dr. Cashman indicated he had
no desire to leave.157
After almost two hours of discussion, the AAAC grouped together in a corner of
the office and developed a list of demands.158 They requested the following:
1. Establishment of a Department of Afro-American Studies by the fall of
1969, with the AAAC controlling the planning of the program.
2. Contribution by the university of one-half the expenses of the
proposed national conference of black students to be held on the
campus.
3. Placing the Martin Luther King Jr. Scholarship Fund in the hands of an
agency of the black community.159
Cashman responded to the demands by saying that the university would continue
the search for private funds for the conference. He also noted that plans were in
development for a graduate program in comparative racial and ethnic studies, which
would include black studies. At 3 P.M., President Moos called but the students declined
to speak with him over the phone. Moos asked to attend the AAAC’s morning meeting
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the following day. The students denied his request and agreed to meet him at 1 P.M.
instead.160
At their Tuesday meeting, the AAAC held intense debates for more than an hour
about what to do in the event their demands received a rebuke. Two basic factions
formed in disagreement over whether a takeover was the proper response. By the time
1:00 P.M. approached, the students left for Morrill Hall without deciding on a definite
course of action.161
According to the Investigating Commission, 60 to 70 black students met President
Moos in Morrill Hall. The president did not expect so many people to attend. However,
Horace Huntley insists that only approximately 40 students attended and that the
commission as well as the Minnesota Daily exaggerated the numbers because they feared
“a mighty army.”162 Rose Mary Freeman described her group as “Black and angry” that
day.163 Freeman herself took the President’s chair and Vice President Paul Cashman
asked her to move. She refused. Instead, she stayed in the seat to let the administration
know that the members of the AAAC were in charge and to eradicate the mental attitude
of submissiveness.164
Moos, along with Assistant Vice President Lukermann and Professor Hyman
Berman, met with the students in hopes of exploring the substance of their demands and
explaining the progress the University made in each of the areas. Moos attempted to
clarify the University’s position on each of the demands. However, Horace Huntley,
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leading the meeting for the AAAC, wanted a “yes” or “no” response to each of their
demands.165 The meeting ended after only 20 or 25 minutes. Feeling a total lack of
progress, the AAAC stated that it appeared the administration said “no” to each of the
demands. Seeing the meeting come to an impasse, President Moos departed for St. Paul
to give a speech.166
Meanwhile, the AAAC began occupying the two offices on the main floor on
Morrill Hall. Rose Mary Freeman wrote,
It had cages with White faces behind every cage. In fact, it was a huge
monster, complex and frustrating, especially if you needed to execute
some business. We, the Black students, members of the Afro-American
Action Committee, moving collectively, high on revolutionary rhetoric,
deeply motivated by a proud sense of pride in our Blackness, decided to
take on the dragon in the streets of Babylon. We decided they had to let
us in.167
Marie Williams suggests that the AAAC chose the Bursar and Admissions and Records
offices to stop the flow of the university. Though they felt that the administration
blocked progress on their demands, taking the president’s office would have lacked
impact on the system as a whole, especially considering he was often gone. They needed
to hit where it would hurt the most and those two offices were the place.168
Ann Pflaum and Stanford Lehmberg cite John Wright in their history of the
university, who said, “Our basic plans, and the list of demands and requirements, were in
part patterned on those stratagems and ideas that were fairly consistently being presented
to universities and colleges around the country.”169 However, Marie Williams recalls no
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models for their plan to take over Morrill Hall. She, Rose Freeman, and Horace Huntley
all agree that the decision to occupy a building until their demand for a black studies
program was met was a decision made in the moment and theirs alone.170
Upon entering the offices, the AAAC announced that staff could continue
working.171 The students sat on desks and in chairs of the office. Dean Summers, head
of the Office of Admissions and Records, and Charles Liesenfelt, Assistant to the
Recorder, attempted to reassure the staff. The two of them instructed the staff to put
papers and records away and depart for the day. They requested that employees leave in
small groups rather than all at once. One of the students heard this order being given and
asked why the administration ordered staff to leave when the students planned on sittingin and not harming anyone.172
Shortly after the occupation began, a white student named Philip Upton
approached the doors of Morrill Hall. In his khaki army jacket, he broke through the
west doors by smashing the coat hangers which held the doors shut. Upon arriving
inside, the Investigating Commission reported that Upton was met by “a black student of
heavy build” who told him that the school was closed.173 Upton insisted that he wanted
to go to the Bursar’s Office to pay some fees and attempted to go around the man.174 But,
the man pushed or threw him to the ground. He hit the outer door and injured his back.175
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After falling to the ground, a black student told him, “You shouldn’t have tried to do
that.” Upton shouted angrily, “It’s my university, too!”176
Joseph Kroll, President of the MSA, and Robert Ross, a member of the Student
Advisory Board (SAB) staff, aided him in his injured state. They called a doctor over
and an ambulance took Upton to the University Health Service. After being examined,
the doctor sent him home. He dealt with some soreness and stiffness in his back but
otherwise suffered no harm. The Investigating Commission reported that anywhere from
30 to 45 black students left after this event expressing disapproval and “saying that they
did not want to be involved in that kind of thing.”177 Though, Horace Huntley says this
number seems a bit high. Given the number of students in the AAAC, not all of whom
participated in the takeover, this would mean that almost everyone left.178 At the same
time, the incident allowed students outside to break the coat hangers and broom handles
which secured the doors. They began entering and exiting at their own will without
anyone stopping them.179 The Investigating Commission reported that until 5:30 P.M.,
the AAAC takeover was a peaceable occupation, despite this event.
When a police officer again interviewed Phillip Upton later in the month, he
reported that he still felt back pains. He told the officer he had experienced problems
with his back since a retreat the previous summer when he sustained a minor back injury
playing football. The altercation at Morrill Hall seemed to aggravate that injury. He also
stated that he could not identify his assailant. At the time, Lester Cannon of the AAAC
176
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told an officer that he did not believe anybody in his organization had anything to do with
the incident and was willing to help out. Philip Upton had left school at the end of the
winter session for financial reasons and taken up a full time job. But, he told the officer
he planned to return to the university when he was financially able.180
At 3 P.M., Vice President Donald Smith convened a committee of faculty and
students in the Regent’s Room of Morrill Hall to determine whether the occupation
violated the University’s demonstration policy. However, the talks shifted over to
possible negotiations with the AAAC when the student group sent them a message that
they would be interested in meeting. Five members of the AAAC later discussed their
demands with the committee.181
Meanwhile, only Liesenfelt was left in the Records and Admissions Office. The
students barricaded one of the sets of doors to the inner lobby area with large wooden
tables. They closed the outer doors on the west side, jammed the south and middle pairs
of doors with coat hangers in the panic bars while guarding the northern doors. Though a
number of students came through the doors into the outer lobby in the early afternoon, the
AAAC and SAB advised them that the building was closed. At 5:30, a group of five
black students entered Liesenfelt’s office and shouted that he must leave.182
Shortly thereafter, a small group of staff began operating the Civil Service Office
in Morrill Hall which opened on Tuesday evenings. A number of applicants waited in the
corridor to meet with staff. However, the AAAC sent students to close the office and
guard the south doors. While some of the applicants immediately left, the staff ignored
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the black students. Fifteen minutes later, the students returned with a janitor to tell the
staff the building had been closed. In accordance with instructions left by the head of the
department, the staff decided to end testing and other operations and close. Normally,
they would have remained open until about 8:30 or 9:00 P.M.183
After nightfall, sixty white members of Students for a Democratic Society and
other organizations appeared at the west doors to join the AAAC takeover. The
Minnesota SDS had been organized in the spring of 1965 to “create a sustained
community of educational and political concern…bringing together liberals and radicals,
activists and scholars, students and faculty.” Their membership fluctuated between 20
and 50 members. White members of other campus organizations attended as well but not
in a capacity to represent their organizations.184
The AAAC told them to take up positions in the outer lobby. Black students
wanted to carefully limit the role of whites and asked them to stay out of the inner
offices.185 Marie Williams notes no animosity toward SDS despite the fact that they
interfered with the progress of the black studies program while the Task Force on Human
Rights was in session. She appreciated their support in the takeover, but noted that they
had to remain in a limited role because they were not members of AAAC and the
takeover “was a black thing.”186
The white radicals made speeches, gave instructions on methods of resistance to
police, and sang songs. Also, the SDS brought large quantities of Vaseline and used fire
hoses to fill waste baskets with water in the event of a tear gas or mace attack. This act
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caused damage to records as water spilled on the floor where records lay. These actions
might also have contributed to the more confrontational mood which developed.187 The
Grand Jury report which preceded the indictment of three participants in the Morrill Hall
takeover noted that later in the evening, a discussion took place among the protesters over
whether or not to burn down Morrill Hall.188 However, the AAAC denied this claim
arguing that the police put a rag into a bottle which contained duplicating fluid to make it
look like a Molotov Cocktail. They then photographed it and presented it to the Grand
Jury as proof that students considered burning the building down.189
The AAAC also allowed community members in. The Investigating Commission
reported that the community split along two lines. One encouraged restraint, order, and
avoiding damage while the other pressed the students to take action to hurt the
University. Though the students were agitated by the thought of police arriving, by about
4:00 A.M., the community members preaching restraint won out.190 Alternatively, Marie
Williams claims that no one pushed for violent action. There may have been one or two
people who got haphazardly carried away at the time, for example a student who called
for burning the building, but no open discussion took place about using violence as a
planned strategy.191
In their history of the university, Pflaum and Lehmberg say the occupation of
Morrill Hall represented a joint effort involving activists from the campus and
community groups and conclude that the pressure to create a black studies department
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came from the outside.192 However, community members were not part of the planning
for the takeover and only showed up later. Pressure for black studies clearly came from
students on the inside of the university.
At the same time, the community members offered a variety of ideas to the
students. One of the community members present was the Reverend Dr. Matthew
Eubanks, who was director of the Citizens Community Center. He discussed survival
tactics in the event that police stormed the building.193 Milt Williams (Mahmoud ElKati) spoke about past struggles for freedom. Rose Mary Freeman wrote, “Brother ElKati talked about the relevance of our history as a people. He suggested that history is
man’s compass by which he finds himself on the map of human geography. The message
was, and is, ‘We are Who We Were.’ The students sat quietly listening, giving all due
respect to their elders.”194 Other community members who came to Morrill Hall included
Syl Davis of The Way and Spike Moss.195 The Minneapolis Tribune also identifies Harry
Davis, executive director of the Minneapolis Urban Coalition and Charles Smith, a social
work aide at North High School. They cite one anonymous University administrator who
mentioned five staff or faculty members who helped including Eugene Briggs, Frank
Wilderson, Laurence Harper, Gloria Williams and Cynthia Neverdon.196 A reflection on
the event by Minnesota Public Radio in 2006 stated that Matthew Stark, a white assistant
professor, also stayed with the students and encouraged them to refrain from vandalizing
offices. He also convinced them to keep the focus on racial issues by not aligning with
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the SDS.197 Finally, Marie Williams suggests that Bobby Higman from the Inner City
Youth League may have been present.198 Clearly, the community showed a great deal of
support and offered assistance to the students after the decision was made to occupy the
building.
During this occupation, the students made long-distance telephone calls to other
colleges including at least one to Berkeley, California.199 Apparently, the University
recorded the conversations because President Moos noted in a later speech that the tapes
of the calls were being examined.200 The Grand Jury’s Investigation produced a list from
the telephone company records which recorded 95 long-distance calls made during the
24-hour occupation.201 Marie Williams does not recall any students making phone calls,
but presumes that students involved in the takeover might have been calling friends or
relatives elsewhere to let them know what was happening.202 These calls suggest the
possibility that the students were connected to other black student unions in their
struggle, but Williams, Massey and Huntley deny this.
By 10:00 P.M., a group of administrators and faculty members had drawn up a
Memorandum of Understanding in response to the three demands and President Moos
approved it. However, the black students found problems with all three of the
university’s answers and rejected the memorandum. Negotiations broke up around 12:30
or 1 A.M. The group decided to convene a meeting of the Administrative Committee at
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9:00 A.M. in Johnston Hall and a meeting of the University Senate at 11:00 A.M. in
Murphy Hall. The AAAC allowed them to leave without interference.203
Around 2:00 A.M., when the last administrator left, the students used desks to
construct a barricade in front of the west entrance and blocked the doors to the outer
lobby. The barricade reached from wall to wall, near the ceiling, and was two desks
deep. The Investigating Commission said this likely caused much of the damage.204 The
departure of the University administrators, in part, led many of the students to believe
that the police were on their way. This view was perpetuated by the rumor that the vault
in the Bursar’s Office was on a time lock and would open automatically at 8:00 A.M.
Rose Mary Freeman described a scene in which one student stood on a desk and called
for the group to burn the building to the ground.205
Many students at this time wanted to leave to avoid the police or white students
storming the building. Freeman said that “fear had gripped the souls, minds and bodies
of these young warriors” with most wanting to leave and few desiring to soldier on.
Holding The Wretched of the Earth in her hand, she seized the moment and spoke to the
group reminding them that they had declared they would stay until their demands were
met. Freeman called for them to search their hearts and make the right decision. Ollie
Shannon, a student athlete, responded first and said he would stand by Rose. Eventually,
everyone made the decision to stay.206
On Wednesday morning, white students began to gather in front of Morrill Hall as
a form of counter-protest. While about 150 white students appeared outside the building
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on the day prior, they mostly watched or attempted to conduct business inside. The
Investigating Commission described their mood as relatively quiet and calm. However,
the crowd which formed on Wednesday morning exhibited hostility. The group
attempted to remove the barricade of the west doors and caused concern among
University administrators. The school officials attempted to calm the group outside and
dissuade them from trying to enter the building.207
Despite this, a large crowd collected outside the north doors and appeared to be
preparing to rush those guarding the entrance. The guards on the inside increased their
numbers and took up fire hoses and fire extinguishers to hold back any on-rushers.
Others inside armed themselves with broom handles and hoes used to clear ice from the
sidewalks. Likely discouraged, the crowd shifted over to yet another side of the
building.208
It also appears that some students succeeded in breaking into the building. Some
white students opened a window and were able to crawl inside. The Investigating
Commission said that two or three white students entered the building and then unwired
the doors on the north side of the east end of the building. Though the accounts remain
blurry, the report also mentions that a news crew might have gained entry and taken
pictures of the inside of the Admissions Office area. It is suggested that black students
and their white allies chased out the few who did enter the building. After this, it is likely
that the AAAC used desks and cabinets to barricade the Admissions Office from further
entrance.209
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As the morning passed, the crowd outside reached nearly 600 and became
increasingly vitriolic. Evidence shows that white students threw ice and, in one case, a
rock, breaking at least two windows. Verbal exchanges also took place between those
inside and those outside. Rose Freeman writes that small groups of white students moved
from one entrance to another shouting, “Niggers, come out, come and get me.” One
black student responded by spraying a fire extinguisher out the window onto a crowd of
white students. Thankfully, near the noon hour, the crowd began to diminish before
much beyond rhetorical violence could occur.210
Meanwhile, talks between representatives of both sides resumed that morning.
The two sides produced a second Memorandum of Understanding which representatives
of both sides signed around 12:30 P.M. on Wednesday afternoon effectively ending the
takeover.211 The new agreement included the development of an academic program to
allow students to obtain a bachelor’s degree in subjects reflecting the experience of black
Americans. A committee of four students, four faculty, and two other individuals would
develop recommendations for the program. The university also agreed to give $5,260
from private university funds to cover half the cost of the February conference. Finally,
seven seats reserved for community members would be added to the 14 member board
controlling the Martin Luther King, Jr. Scholarship Fund. The AAAC would be allowed
to name four of the seven community members as well as four of the seven students who
sat on the board.212
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A half hour later the students were escorted out of Morrill Hall via the tunnel
system to avoid the crowd of hostile white students.213 As they triumphantly crossed a
bridge, a photo of them was taken which would later play a role in criminal indictments.
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Chapter 3: “Let’s Stop Kissing the Boots of Minorities”: Public Outcry, The
Morrill Hall Bills, and the Trial of the Morrill Hall Three

Many groups responded harshly to the takeover, especially the state government.
Sen. Donald Sinclair, chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, and Rep. Richard
Fitzsimmons, chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, stated that a failure by
university officials to discipline the black students responsible for property damage
would “not sit kindly with them or other legislators.”214 Representative John Skeate said
he intended to introduce a bill which would make it unlawful for a student to engage in
any type of demonstration that resulted in injury or damage to public property. Anyone
in violation of this statute would be barred from public colleges and universities for one
year.215 At the same time, Representative Warren Chamberlain introduced a bill which
would deny state scholarship money to any student taking part in demonstrations.216
Though the dominant sentiment was one of disapproval, the legislature occasionally
expressed other reactions to the takeover. For instance, Representative Rodney Searle,
who sat on the Higher Education Committee, said the demands of black students
remained impossible to implement because of the scarcity of black college professors.217
Governor Harold LeVander indicated that any disruption in the university
administration would not be tolerated in the future, though disciplinary action would be a
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university matter.218 At the same time, LeVander praised President Moos at a press
conference for ending the takeover quickly and peacefully. Though he did qualify his
statement saying he was satisfied with the administration’s handling of the incident to the
extent that it ended the dispute without violence. He did not want students to believe that
forceful action brought results, which is how he felt they might interpret it.219
Interestingly, at the same conference LeVander told reporters that he planned to
ask Nixon to give states a chunk of the federal surplus projected by Johnson. He
estimated that the current surtax would cost Minnesota $40 million over two years.220
This would be a factor later as public universities like the Twin Cities campus
experienced funding shortages which led to disputes over cutting programs and faculty,
especially relatively new programs like black studies.
While LeVander generally praised Moos, the legislators expressed some anger
and disappointment with his decisions. Moos was the first University of Minnesota
graduate to become president and, in their history of the university, Stanford Lehmberg
and Ann Pflaum say that allowed him to bring an understanding of the state and its
politics.221 But, in this particular instance, it did not stop him from coming under fire.
Representative Louis Murray said, “I think Moos has bent over backwards in trying to
please these people. If they’re going to continue, I’m in favor of the university people
making the Chicago police look like a bunch of amateurs.” Other legislators like Vernon
Sommerdorf and Helen McMillan, however, opposed such a hard-line stance on the
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grounds that it would make martyrs of rebels.222 Most legislators, including the chairmen
of the two finance committees, opposed penalizing the University as a whole “because of
the actions of a militant minority.” However, Senator Donald Sinclair Stephen said the
University would likely lose prestige in the eyes of the average Minnesotan, especially
since the administration capitulated to lawbreakers.223
The House Subcommittee on Higher Education ended up holding public hearings
on the three bills which legislators proposed in the wake of the Morrill Hall takeover,
dubbed the Morrill Hall Bills. One bill would have cut off state financial aid to any
student involved in any riot or demonstration. Another would have permanently expelled
any teacher or student who caused damage to any public property during a demonstration.
The third would have expelled any student participating in a demonstration that resulted
in personal injury or property damage for one full school term and make that student
ineligible to enter another state public school for at least one year. A fourth bill which
made it a gross misdemeanor to commandeer a public building had already passed the
House 111 to 18.224
C. Robert Morris, a law professor at the university as well as a representative of
the Minnesota Civil Liberties Union, spoke to the committee and labeled the bills
unconstitutional because they restricted freedom of speech and assembly and violated the
due process clause. Moreover, the legislature used vague wording making the scope of
the laws unclear. He specifically attacked the bill which would have withheld state
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financial aid and said it discriminated against the poor and proposed arbitrary
punishment.225
Dr. Paul Cashman, vice president for student affairs, opposed the bills in another
hearing on the proposed legislation. He argued that the requirement that students be
expelled or lose scholarships might increase violence rather than decrease it. Moreover,
incidents of planned violence remained limited and adequate legal remedies existed to
respond to them. Instead, “cause-related events” prevailed and started with peaceful
demonstrations based on valid complaints. He felt the school would be wrong to
suppress such speech. Alternatively, Cashman suggested the legislature provide money
for scholarships for disadvantaged students, for discretionary funds for colleges to deal
with special problems, and for hiring more personnel to handle student affairs. Finally,
he felt that the student demonstrations of the 1960s resembled the labor unrest of the
1930s. As those protests were met by defining the rights of laborers, so modern
legislation should define the rights of students, rather than eliminate them.226
Besides attacks from the state government, students also faced repercussions from
federal organizations. President Nixon actively worked to block aid to students involved
in demonstrations. The 1969 appropriations bill for the Department of Health, Education
and Welfare stated that no funds could aid any student or faculty member convicted by
any court of general jurisdiction of the use of or assistance in the use of force, trespass, or
seizure or property under control of a college to prevent officials or students from
engaging in their duties or pursuing studies. Moreover, students who participated but
were not arrested could be denied aid under the Higher Education Act of 1968. A school
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would need to determine that a student willfully refused to obey its lawful regulation or
order and that the refusal was of a serious nature and contributed to substantial disruption
of the administration of the institution.227
The public reaction resembled the legislature’s response. Citizens flooded the
University of Minnesota with letters responding to the takeover and the administration’s
decisions. One letter quoted in the Minneapolis Star said, “Dr. Moos: You have lost our
respect by kissing the boots of a disgusting, belligerent minority.”228 Nationwide, a
Gallup Poll quoted in the Minneapolis Tribune revealed the public attitude toward
“student disorders” on university and college campuses. It found that 8 out of 10
Americans favored expelling and taking federal loans away from students who broke
laws in campus demonstrations. Seven out of 10 opposed giving students a greater voice
in running colleges. However, public perception of disorder did not match the facts
which, in California, showed that only 210 of the 29,000 publicly-aided students at 18
state colleges had been arrested as a result of demonstrations. This disproved Governor
Reagan’s statement that “a disproportionate number of students receiving federal aid
have been involved in disruption.”229
The public reaction to the Morrill Hall Takeover was likely exacerbated by the
“freedom of speech” controversy which occurred at the University months earlier. The
Office of Student Affairs found,
Much of the general public seemed to regard the Morrill Hall take-over as
but another example—though more disgraceful—of failure of the
University to be mindful of and responsive to the traditional values and
proprieties which the public expects to be upheld. As expressed by the
University Director of Alumni Relations, numerous friends of the
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University were shocked and saddened by what had occurred during the
autumn quarter when the use of vulgar language in the Minnesota Daily
had gone unpunished; but the Morrill Hall episode, coming on top of this,
incensed many and produced a deep feeling of indignation and outrage.230
In response to the criticism, the University of Minnesota administration began a
coordinated public relations campaign in defense of their decisions. They drafted a letter
which they sent to 15,000 people to help them understand the event and its handling. The
letter made the argument that, “In no other case we know had the issue been resolved
more peaceably, with less violence and property damage, with more rapidity, and with
more satisfactory outcome than this one at Minnesota.”231 Communication was
particularly important in improving the situation. R. Eugene Briggs, student union
program consultant noted, the sit-in was the result in a breakdown in communication.232
The negotiations during the takeover focused on resolving this problem. The
Investigating Commission reported,
The progress made on January 14 and 15, 1969 in furthering both
understanding by AAAC of the efforts the University was making and was
prepared to make in the curriculum area and understanding by the
University of the needs of black students in this area suggests to the
Commission that better communications have been worked out and that
faculty activity has been galvanized toward planning curriculum
development in Afro American studies leading to an undergratduate [sic]
degree.233
At the same time, Malcolm Moos attempted to advance the notion that the
peaceful resolution was a one-time deal. In a speech likely meant to cater to angry
legislators and the upset public, Moos said, in any repeat of the incident, he might resort
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to force within hours. In contradiction, he claimed that speculation about the use of force
in response to future disruptions was provocative and did not belong in the discussion.
Moos also argued that “a newfound sense of student-faculty responsibility” represented
the best defense against future incidents, not increasing the number of campus police. He
followed that by saying, “I can assure you if we get another one I guess we will have to
reach for the police.”234 These back-and-forth statements were part of Moos’ attempt to
cater to both crowds: those who favored the use of force and those who felt the right
move lay in nonviolent resolution.
Despite these contradictions, part of what allowed Malcolm Moos to retain his
position as president was his ability to communicate with the faculty, students, politicians
and public. The Minneapolis Star noted,
Moos has a keen, even charming public relations instinct. He relishes
bantering with reporters, reflecting his Baltimore Sun editorial writing
days, his Eisenhower speech-writing stint, and other academic and Ford
Foundation positions where information dissemination was part of the job.
This contrasts with many aspects of the university’s routine functions,
which seem to be conducted in endless obscure meetings from which
officials with information affecting taxpayers cannot be summoned. And
the public regents’ meetings are no more than mumbled ratification of an
agenda, presumably previously debated to strip it of any controversial
items.235
Moos’ response to protest came to define his presidency. As the authors of The
University of Minnesota 1945-2000 find, leading the university through civil rights, antiwar, environmental, and women’s activism represented the greatest challenge during
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Moos’ tenure from 1967 to 1974.236 He did not end up going the way of 72 other college
presidents nationwide who had resigned their posts as of May 15, 1969.237
In an effort to improve communication with the state legislature, Moos met
separately with eight House Conservatives, the Democratic Farm Labor minority caucus,
and with the majority House Conservatives. At these meetings, he explained why the
administration chose to take the actions it did and what they planned to do to investigate
the incident and discipline those involved.238 Though, Moos later rejected the request
that lawmakers be included on the panel investigating the occupation.239
Communicating the university’s position was not the only response. The
administration also took concrete action. President Moos announced that he would start
an investigation into disciplinary action against demonstrators even though he earlier
informed the Faculty Senate that the administration never proclaimed an official violation
of university policy on demonstrations.240 Moos’ action was in keeping with the
University of Minnesota Commission on Campus Demonstrations recommendations of
May 23, 1968, which included a call for an investigatory body divorced from the hearing
and adjudication process.241 This body became the Investigating Commission of the
Morrill Hall Incident which produced a key report documenting the takeover.
The damage to Morrill Hall became a critical issue in the eyes of the public and
legislature as well as a point of interest for the investigation. Citizens questioned Moos
for agreeing to give the AAAC funding for their conference after they caused the school
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monetary loss by damaging the building to the tune of $11,000. The president defended
himself by saying that he was not aware of the extent of the damage at the time of the
agreement and that those responsible for the loss would be held accountable for the
cost.242
However, on January 23, the university lowered the cost of the damage from the
original estimate of $11,000 to $7,300. This figure did not include the costs associated
with putting the records back in order. Moos made clear that all records either remained
intact or contained a corresponding back-up copy. As mentioned previously, damage to
records and property was incidental to the barricading and preparation for a police attack.
Some theft occurred including small sums of money, an adding machine, and some
personal property. Rose Mary Freeman wrote of returning after a meeting with the
administration to find, “The AAAC was in the midst of total anarchy. Desks had been
overturned, files were scattered all over the floor, Morrill Hall had met with havoc.”243
The Investigating Commission reported that some students intentionally damaged
property to interfere with university affairs or to release tension and anger. But, they
pointed out that if the AAAC planned to cause serious loss to the university, the damage
would have been much clearer and more severe. Instead, the protessters left many
valuable machines untouched and no incidents of arson took place. Moreover, the rumor
of black students urinating or defecating on files and desks appeared completely
unfounded. No one presented any photographic evidence that such a thing took place.
The person who reported to police that someone had defecated in two desk drawers was
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never named and never came forward to verify the claim. By January 27, most services
in the Office of Admissions and Records were functioning as usual.244
The public also posed the question, “Why did the University concede to the black
students’ demands?” A University Memo issued shortly after the takeover stated that the
administration settled for a variety of reasons: the demands matched plans already
moving forward in the University, to avoid bloodshed, to continue normal University
functions as soon as possible, and to build community understanding. The Faculty
Senate also emphasized that all of the demands from the AAAC had been under
discussion for a long time. The University explained its position as follows,
The University did not agree to a Department of Afro-American studies –
it did agree to press forward with its developing plans for afro-studies
programs in a more general program of ethical [sic] studies. The
University did not agree to support a black conference without control. It
did agree to provide funds for a conference, as it does for other groups,
provided a budget and conference plan is developed. The University did
not give control of the MLK fund to outside control. Since the University
does not control the fund, it could not do so. The University did agree to
assist in recommending the adding of community members to the MLK
Board. The University believes all of these steps are educationally sound
and in the interest of all students.245
In the opinion of administrators, the university had not acquiesced to force, but moved
forward with things they planned to do all along.246
Moreover, they emphasized that calling the police would not have been a
courageous step. Such an action would have removed the administration from the
process and would have escalated or prolonged the controversy. Instead, the
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administration’s use of negotiation would create an open communication line and mutual
trust which would work to prevent future protests by opening up the path to discussion so
major protests would be unnecessary for students to get their viewpoint heard.247 Their
case was convincing to the Board of Regents. On February 11, the Appropriations
Committee of the University Board of Regents met and backed President Moos’ handling
of the Morrill Hall takeover. Regent Fred Hughes stated that their approval was
unanimous.248
The University held many public conferences on the event so the public could
develop a full understanding of the various aspects of the situation. However, in
reporting on these conferences, Thue O. Rasmussen of the Office of Student Affairs
found that the conferences offered evidence of the lack of mutual respect and lingering
rift between black students and their allies and their mostly white critics. He came to the
“sobering realization” that social relations between groups of different racial or ethnic
backgrounds still lacked understanding or friendliness.249
Besides being questioned by local people, the campus takeovers around the
country were questioned by national figures like Roy Wilkins, the head of the NAACP
and 1923 graduate of the University of Minnesota. While he agreed that the history and
problems of African Americans needed to be part of University curricula, he opposed the
method of takeover and the goal of autonomy. He felt that having black students picking
the teachers and having the control of a department budget “represent[ed] setting up Jim
Crow schools.” He also declared that “autonomous racial schools” would be challenged
in court by the NAACP. Finally, he suggested black students would serve their race
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better by getting back into the classrooms, earning their degrees, and helping the
NAACP.250
The University administration adopted a reflective mood in light of all this
criticism. On the positive side, they claimed that the event demonstrated the
effectiveness of negotiation, achieved accord without violence, improved communication
and understanding with African American students, and showed the effectiveness of
friendly and instantly available relationships of university leaders with the leaders of the
black community. On the negative side, the university noted the temporary disruption of
administrative functions, damage and loss of money, public demand to avoid future
disruptions, and wide off-campus anger at the methods employed by the university in the
emergency.251
Besides conducting an investigation, the university immediately began
implementing a new Campus Demonstrations Policy in response to the takeover. This
seemed to be a result of widespread opposition to tactics used. Many felt that in order to
gain their rights, the AAAC infringed on other students’ rights by halting the business of
the University. Moreover, an editorial in the Minneapolis Tribune noted that extremism
was antidemocratic and may invite an extremist reaction harmful to the original cause.252
A week after the takeover, Rose Freeman read a prepared statement to the press
commending the administration for their handling of the Morrill Hall takeover. The press
asked her about the damage to property and Freeman made clear that the damage was
incidental to the creation of barricades. The alternative would have been potential loss of
life when white students rushed the building. Some also asked Freeman about
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disciplinary action against those responsible. She agreed that action should be taken and
that the University and society should be held responsible.253 Alternatively, Freeman
thanked community organizations including The Way, the Minneapolis Urban Coalition
and the St. Paul Urban League as well as the Department of Civil Rights.254
At the same time, the AAAC condemned press coverage of the takeover. They
specifically excluded the reporters of one television station from the press conference
because of their negative coverage. The AAAC said that the banned station exaggerated
damage to the building. More broadly, news reports ignored the hostile attitude of whites
outside the building and the problems they created by attempting to break in.255
Overall, student reaction to the takeover was mixed. The Pioneer Hall Council
passed a motion of censure claiming that the AAAC disrupted the normal functioning of
the University and caused considerable inconvenience. They recommended punishment
and restitution for any damage caused. Similarly, a group calling themselves the Student
Committee for Peaceful Dissent collected signatures for a petition which called for the
suspension or expulsion of all students who took part in the takeover.256 Alternatively,
the Minnesota Students Association (MSA) Senate passed a resolution supporting the
AAAC’s efforts. They called for the Task Force on Human Rights to investigate
problems of institutional racism, the MSA Human Relations Commission to hold a
briefing for students on the Morrill Hall takeover and to establish an educational program
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to increase racial sensitivity, and for students involved to speak to campus groups about
the event.257
Roughly a week after the event, Malcolm Moos chose his 12 member committee
of faculty, students, administrators and community members who would investigate the
takeover of Morrill Hall. He requested they pull together a factual account of the
takeover and the events preceding it, produce a report which would help determine
whether and which charges should be brought against those participating in the takeover,
and issue their report at the earliest possible time consistent with thorough exploration.258
Rose Mary Freeman, among others, opposed the commission for meeting behind closed
doors. She felt this allowed them to reveal only those pieces of evidence which they felt
were important and become the sole interpreter of events in question.259
Not surprisingly, the commission came to many conclusions that seemed to lay
blame on black students, though the intent of the commission was not to identify guilty
parties. The commission said that the black students did not understand the purpose of
starting a black studies program with the creation of a graduate degree in comparative
racial and ethnic studies and then working backwards to an undergraduate degree.
Similarly, they failed to realize that financial aid included loans and work, not just
grants.260 However, the minutes of the January 30 meeting of the Investigating
Commission show that Dr. Cashman testified that some recruiters might have been
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deliberately exploiting or distorting the phrase “full financial assistance,” misleading
potential students as to its true meaning.261
The report also blamed the AAAC for not effectively using the channels available
to them, did not understand university requirements for conference planning and
budgeting, failed to comprehend that the faculty was responsible for developing a
program in black studies, and that a program takes a long time to come to fruition in a
large university. Finally, while the report stated that the damage resulted from defensive
efforts to barricade, it pointed out that some barricading was done during the night before
the crowd became a threat.262 They failed to note that at least one student attempted
breaking in the day before and that students felt the police would be called in at night and
barricaded for that reason as well.
In spite of Rose’s opposition to the commission, Horace Huntley led the AAAC
towards a decision to appear before the investigating body. He convinced others that it
would be possible to keep the state from taking legal action against the organization if
they offered their cooperation. In opposition, Rose Mary Freeman argued that appearing
before the commission would not keep the state from taking legal action and based her
argument on the experiences of groups elsewhere. Moreover, she stated that testifying
could place some AAAC members in jeopardy if the state took action. But, the group
decided to appear before the commission despite the disapproval of their president.
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Horace Huntley and Anna Stanley went as representatives of the AAAC and offered a
prepared statement to the commission on February 28, 1969.263
Meanwhile, the University Athletic Department announced the week after the
takeover that no action would be taken against the nine black football players who
participated in the occupation. The Athletic Director, Marsh Ryman, noted that the
department had no written policy governing athletes’ participation in demonstrations or
protests. Similarly, the football coach, Murray Warmath, stated that athletes retained the
right to demonstrate and, if physical violence or force is involved, the law would govern
that.264
In February, the AAAC held their conference entitled “Which Way Black
Students? The Role of Black Students in the White University.” The idea for the
conference came from discussions within the organization about the issue of blackness.265
Rose Mary Freeman and Marie Braddock had attended a conference at Howard
University where James Turner spoke. This “eye-opening experience” provided
inspiration for the black students at the University of Minnesota to hold their own
conference.266 The event served a very concrete purpose for those of the AAAC: they
intended to integrate the knowledge gained from the conference with their goals of
establishing an Afro-American Studies Department and improving the Martin Luther
King Scholarship Program.267 Whites were excluded from conference workshops
because their presence was said to discourage open disagreement and free discussion
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among blacks.268 Also, groups like the AAAC tended to operate under Carmichael and
Hamilton’s notion of black power which insisted that before a group can enter open
society, it must first close ranks.269
Numerous presenters including nationally recognized speakers and local
organizers offered ideas at the conference. Brother James Turner, a graduate student at
Northwestern, had been traveling to campuses throughout the country sharing his
knowledge of black history and culture. He offered tactics that could entice
administrations to aid black students on college campuses. Rufus “Catfish” Mayfield of
Pride, Inc. in Washington, D.C., had a syndicated column called “Voice From the
Ghetto.” He worked on dealing with many problems facing the black community in D.C.
Val Gray founded the Kuumba Theater and participated in the Black Arts Movement in
Chicago. She presented a lecture on the “Voice of the Black Writer.” Playthell
Benjamin, a historian and social commentator from Philadelphia, spoke on “Revolution
and Black History.” He was noted for his encyclopedic knowledge of revolutionary
writings. Though also scheduled to present, Fannie Lou Hamer of the Mississippi
Freedom Democratic Party found herself unable to attend due to illness. The conference
also featured the Black Rose Dance Troupe from New York City. They performed
African drumming, song, and dance. In the end, though, the most charismatic and
recognized speaker at the conference was Muhammad Ali. He presented a speech that
was described as “informational, inspirational, comical and myth shattering.”270
The university administrators remained aware of the possibility of violence at the
conference. They compiled a series of confidential documents outlining their plans to
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prevent or control violence. Since only 200 to 300 people were expected, they believed
the University Police and Student Affairs personnel could handle law enforcement
problems. The police would minimize visibility while increasing their patrolling of the
area around the Union where the conference would be centered. The administrators laid
out four scenarios for violence: the appearance of large numbers of militants from the
community or outside the state, development of a substantial backlash, sudden
enlargement of the conference with large numbers of conferees without housing or food,
and/or precipitation of an incident by white radicals.271
Following the conference, the administration congratulated itself for its strategic
planning to avoid violence. In one instance, Donald Zander of the Department of
University Student Unions wrote to the director of the University Police Department that
their patrol of the Union with at least two detectives from 7 A.M. to 2 A.M. offered
crucial support.272
Besides policing the activities of the AAAC, legal action was also being taken.
Though the date is unclear, it is likely that following the Morrill Hall takeover, when
certain segments of the white population were upset with the organization, the AAAC
faced charges that it violated Section 363.03, Subdivision 5 of the State Act Against
Discrimination by excluding white people from membership. However, the Department
of Human Rights could not substantiate that any white student ever applied for
membership in the organization in question and could not prove discrimination.
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Moreover, the organization’s constitution and bylaws did not prohibit membership on the
basis of race, creed, color, religion or national origin.273
At the same time, the Commissioner of Human Rights did express concern
because it was highly improbable that any white student would be accepted into the
organization. The investigation also showed that “considerable pressure is put on all
black students to participate and it has been a problem to some black students who have
no desire to join AAAC.” Moreover, people expressed reluctance to complain about the
AAAC for fear of their identity being known.274
The report also questioned whether the university might be allowing segregation.
Since it allowed an exemption for religious organizations to exclude members, the
university opened the door for groups to exclude members on other bases. Also, the
policy of the Student Activities Bureau stated its intent to “preserve individual
differences.” The commissioner argued that this condoned or implied consent of separate
organizations based on individual or group differences which may impede desegregation
and encourage rebellion on the part of minorities.275
The AAAC dealt with further legal consequences. Shortly after their successful
conference, three members of the AAAC underwent indictment and arrest. The President
of the Minneapolis Police Officers’ Federation had indicated on January 20 that he would
write the Chief Judge of the Hennepin District Court, Judge Rolf Fosseen, and ask him to
convene a grand jury to investigate the Morrill Hall incident.276 On Monday, March 3,
the Hennepin County Grand Jury issued an indictment against Horace Huntley, Rose
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Mary Freeman, Warren Tucker, Jr., as well as Richard Roe and Jane Doe. The last two
indictments allowed them to reserve the right to indict other persons involved whose
identities were unknown at the time.277
Horace Huntley believed that the prosecutors picked those three because of a
published picture showing them walking triumphantly over a bridge after the sit-in.278
The indictments charged: aggravated criminal damage to property, including “mutilating,
defacing, breaking, destroying, tearing, smashing, littering, scattering, piling, and
barricading” equipment, supplies and the building itself; riot, including destruction of
property and “taking exclusive possession of a portion of said Morrill Hall, and by acts,
force, threats and unauthorized commands”; and two counts of unlawful assembly.
Though the students assembled with lawful purpose, once there, they supposedly
conducted themselves in a disorderly manner which disturbed and threatened the public
peace.279
On Wednesday, police arrested Horace Huntley and Warren Tucker, Jr., at their
homes (which were two houses apart) around 6:30 A.M. Huntley asked an officer why
they needed so many police to apprehend two people and the officer told him it was a
protective measure. Next time, he would come alone. The two were taken to jail and
their attorneys Kenneth Tilsen, a friend of Rose Mary’s, and Joyce A. Hughes, requested
and received a continuance until April 3.280
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Rose Mary Freeman was arrested later in the day, at 1 P.M., at the Citizen’s
Community Center. She received call from Horace in the morning when the police
showed up at his house. They did not come to her house, so she went to campus to the
AAAC office. She was told about a rally protesting the arrests. Organizers asked her to
speak to the group in front of Coffman Union. But, she responded, “I’m not interested in
educating White people about Black people.”281
Rose Mary Freeman turned to Kenneth E. Tilsen, a prominent St. Paul attorney,
for help following the indictments. Tilsen, along with his wife, Rachel, had adopted her
into their family. Ken and Rachel Tilsen had been involved in “radical” activity
throughout the 1950s and 1960s with Ken being investigated by the House Un-American
Activities Committee.282 Eventually, Freeman went to the police station when Tilsen
informed her that a judge made himself available to hold an arraignment right away
preventing her from spending a night in jail. Still, many community leaders remained
concerned about her safety because to get to the arraignment, the police car would drive
through a tunnel under the courthouse. In that tunnel, the police were known to “crack
heads.” So, it was agreed that a man named Randy Staten would ride with her through
the tunnel and she passed unharmed.283
The decision to indict and arrest the students met with severe criticism from many
groups. A document, most likely written by the Liberation Coalition, a group formed in
the wake of the arrests, called the indictments of Richard Roe and Jane Doe a blank
check allowing the arrest of anyone on campus. Moreover, they questioned the timing of
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the indictments which came the week before final exams in a likely attempt to punish the
students academically for standing up for their rights.284
In response to the arrests, a spontaneous demonstration began in the history class
of Allan Spear. The class focused on race and nationality. It began at 11 A.M. and soon
after, some students began talking about the arrests of three black students. After talking
for a half-hour, they decided to march. Professor Spear, the university’s teacher of black
history and a member of the committee drawing up a proposal for a major in black
studies, accompanied the students.285 Joe Kroll, president of the Minnesota Student
Association, led the march.286 It grew to about 300 students as it moved to the office of
President Moos and then to the fourth floor courtrooms of City Hall. The student leaders
saw Hennepin County Attorney George Scott and protested the grand jury indictments
which they felt were ill-timed, ill-conceived, and without regard to the sensitivity of the
situation on the university campus.287 Scott held a brief question-and-answer session so
students could get a response to their grievances. The protest ended without incident.
Shortly thereafter, the Minnesota Student Association and many other student
groups agreed on a resolution condemning the grand jury’s action.288 Beyond that,
another march took place. On March 6, roughly 500 students met on campus at noon and
marched to the courthouse to present a petition with about 700 signatures to George
Scott. With him out to lunch, they presented the petition to Alderman Gerald
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Hegstrom.289 Peter Vaughan of the Minneapolis Star noted that, “The indictments
accomplished what radicals on the campus have been seeking vainly to bring about for
the past two years. Students, both radical and politically uncommitted, have rallied
together in a spontaneous reaction to the indictments.”290 In fact, even right-leaning
groups joined the Liberation Coalition. The Young Republicans of Minnesota and the
New Republicans both announced their support.291
Students planned a 24-hour-a-day sit-in at the Hennepin County Courthouse to
continue until the indictments were dropped. However, the sit-in would have taken place
during the week of final examinations. Moreover, radical students, especially those from
Students for a Democratic Society, opposed the sit-in because it was likely to sap the
considerable support which had built up in favor of the movement. Despite this, the
decision to stage the sit-in was made. However, it faced problems in organizing when
few students showed up to hand out leaflets and a study day meant many people were not
out-and-about on campus.292 Soon, the prospects of a long sit-in derailed.
Similarly, University officials felt dismayed at the indictments, especially
considering the University’s Investigating Commission report remained forthcoming.
The Faculty Senate voted to condemn the Grand Jury’s interference with university
proceedings.293 The Minnesota Urban Coalition, led by Harry Davis, also adopted a
resolution condemning the action taken by the Grand Jury. Even further, the director of
the Hennepin County Office of Economic Opportunities, a black member of the Grand
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Jury, the Commissioner of Human Rights for Minnesota, and the Council of Religious
Advisers, all condemned the action.294
Given the widespread opposition, campus and community groups formed the
Liberation Coalition to bring together groups against the indictments. The Liberation
Coalition sent out a message to faculty declaring the indictments politically motivated
and revealed their intention to mobilize the greatest possible support to oppose the
charges.295 The AAAC experienced some tension with the Liberation Coalition as one
leader, Anna Stanley, insisted that the AAAC have veto power over the coalition. In the
end, the Liberation Coalition gave the AAAC veto power over press releases, but nothing
further.296
The coalition also organized Liberation Week from March 31 to April 3, the day
Rose Mary Freeman was scheduled to appear in court. The Liberation Coalition asked
faculty to free their students to participate in the week’s events. They also held a meeting
of all faculty who wished to contribute to the week’s events and open up their classrooms
for meetings.297 The week included speeches by nationally known leaders, discussions,
workshops, and films. A man named Nathan Wright spoke on “Experimental Liturgy”
and Ron March, a black labor leader from Detroit, also addressed supporters of the
accused. Two rock groups performed to raise money for the defense. The coalition also
showed films on Malcolm X, Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Black Panthers.298
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A Wednesday night rally saw 250 people attend to support the defense of the
Morrill Hall Three. Bill Tilton spoke and worked to raise money. The coalition also
accrued funds by selling posters and buttons with the images of the three indicted
students. A teach-in took place and featured Henry Jack of North American Red
Power.299 The week culminated in a march and demonstration of more than 5,000 people
at the courthouse, representing one of the coalition’s greatest successes. Horace Huntley
wrote, “Without this grouping of committed persons from all walks of life, ethnic groups,
diverse political persuasions, and races, it is clear to me that the three of us could have
very well become criminal justice statistics of a long duration.”300
Though some were concerned that the trial would take place during the summer
when the student body was not there to support the accused, it ended up being scheduled
for the fall. The defense’s legal challenges might have helped in delaying the trial. First,
the students’ lawyers challenged the indictment by saying it violated the state law
forbidding the inclusion of multiple claims which were not part of the same “behavioral
incident.” Since the occupation extended over two days, it constituted more than one
incident. Second, any defendant in a criminal case possessed the right to dismiss a judge
by filing an affidavit of prejudice without specifying why he or she believed the judge
harbored prejudice. The court transferred the case from Judge Dana Nicholson to Judge
Douglas K. Amdahl.301
At the end of the school year, Tom Gilsenan took over the presidency of the
Minnesota Student Association and the Chair of the Liberation Coalition. At this point,
the coalition concerned itself primarily with raising money. Initially, Tilsen projected the
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defense would cost $7,500. However, the prosecution later proposed calling 200
witnesses, raising the cost of the trial to $30,000. The Coalition initiated numerous
fundraising activities including dances, selling buttons, and soliciting donations around
campus and in the community as they did during Liberation Week.302
In the fall, the Afro-American Action Committee called for a student strike
beginning on October 20, 1969, until the end of the trial.303 The AAAC also issued their
own indictment. They charged Malcolm Moos, Paul Cashman, and James Reeves,
Richard Roe, Jane Doe, the University, the city of Minneapolis and the state of
Minnesota for institutional racist practices. This included denying students of various
races a meaningful education, ignoring the contributions of African Americans, Chicano
Americans, the Sioux, Chippewa, and other Native American tribes, “creating a
propaganda machine which they so label as education” but which is “merely a finishing
school for robots,” creating and releasing biased information that the state used for
repression, and for obscuring the real reasons behind the Morrill Hall takeover.304 The
AAAC also pointed out that the Grand Jury issued no indictment against white students
inside Morrill Hall or white students who broke several windows. Moreover, the school
accepted no funds from the white community for damage done to Morrill Hall but did
take them from the African American community.305 The Liberation Coalition reported
that the black community paid for at least fifty percent of the damage.306 They demanded
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that all money collected to repair the building be added to the Martin Luther King
Scholarship Fund.307
On October 20, 1969, the trial proceedings began. Roughly 800 to 1000 people,
mostly students, marched in support of the Morrill Hall Three. The AAAC and African
Americans from the community also committed to having a strong presence inside the
courtroom each day in support of the students.308 During jury selection, of the thirty
prospects, only one identified himself as an African American. Such a racially
imbalanced panel led Rose Mary Freeman to think of Peter Poyas, who was placed on
trial in 1822 for participating in a slave rebellion. Poyas said to the judge, “You have
predetermined to shed my blood; why then this mockery of a trial?” She clearly expected
the trial to be a farce as neither her, nor Horace or Warren damaged any property or
rioted. Since they were registered students of the University, she also believed they could
not be convicted of unlawful assembly.309
The destruction of property again became a central issue. The prosecution called
a university policeman who went through an inventory of the upturned desks, damaged
typewriters, and dismantled machines. However, the officer never conducted an
inventory prior to the takeover, so the prosecution lacked proof that the students brought
about these alterations while participating in the takeover. The prosecution also called
two clerks who said that records were “urine colored” and other papers were ripped,
dirty, or wet. Witnesses took the stand to tell of human feces left in wastebaskets. Yet,
no witness could present any documentation, nor could they identify any of the three
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defendants as the perpetrators of any of these acts.310 The prosecution did not end up
calling 30 people to the stand.
In response, the defense called just three witnesses and presented three salient
points. First, numerous white students took part in the occupation yet the prosecution’s
witnesses testified that only black students participated. Moreover, no witness linked any
of the defendants to the damage. Finally, the three defendants went to other parts of the
building for negotiations for at least 11 of the 24 hours of the sit-in.311
In the end, the jury deliberated for about a dozen hours. They acquitted Warren
Tucker of all charges. However, the jury convicted Horace Huntley and Rose Mary
Freeman of unlawful assembly while acquitting them of the other charges.312 The
conviction of misdemeanor unlawful assembly carried a possible 90-day sentence or a
$300 fine. Huntley and Freeman received 90-day suspended sentences and the judge
placed them on one year of supervised probation.313 In light of the trial, Malcolm Moos
opted not to take any disciplinary action on behalf of the university. He noted that the
three leaders lived under stressful and anxious conditions for a number of months. Given
these circumstances, he found no need for further punishment.314
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Chapter 4: “The Department of Humanization at a Finishing School for Robots”:
The Early Years of Black Studies at the University of Minnesota

The University administrators deferred responsibility for creating a new
department.315 As was often the case, President Malcolm Moos named a committee to
establish a program for students to earn a bachelor of arts in African American studies.
Among the members included on this committee were Allan Spear, a professor of history
and advocate for black studies, Warren Tucker, a sophomore and participant in the
takeover who was later put on trial and acquitted, and Milton Williams (Mahmoud ElKati) of The Way. The agreement for the creation of the committee stated that the
president’s office would fully support the development of a program to offer “a full
reflection of the experience of Black people in America” by the fall of 1969, but the
faculty would have the final decision regarding the new curriculum and degree
program.316
The first course dealing with black culture offered at the University of Minnesota
began on March 24, 1969. It was an evening education program run through the
extension division of the university. Non-traditional students comprised the student body
for this course. The class formed part of a four-section sequence called “Inter-Cultural
Education” and aimed at equipping teachers who worked in racially mixed schools. Each
of the four courses focused on a different minority group. The first course examined
“Negro culture” and emphasized transferring that information and effectively teaching
African-American children. The University and local education officials felt that many
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African American students exhibited low self-esteem causing them to function poorly in
the classroom. So, this course intended to make white teachers more confident in
teaching about black culture and boost student knowledge and esteem as well.317
Meanwhile, the president made the report of the committee on the creation of a
black studies program available in early May. After the president approved the proposal,
he submitted it to four bodies within the College of Liberal Arts for approval. The
committee chair, Frank Wilderson of the University’s Education Department, approved
of the report and felt that the university should be proud of its efforts to develop a black
studies program.318
The report began with a preamble recognizing the origins of the document. The
committee wrote, “The political and social events of the past few years have finally
awakened certain segments of the academic community to the need for comprehensive
consideration of black history, culture and society as an integral part of the university
curriculum.” It also argued, “Black studies need no more justification – on intellectual
and academic grounds – than do Asian studies or European studies; the only serious
question is why they have been for so long neglected and how this neglect can now best
be rectified.”319
The proposal called for a degree-granting Department of Afro-American Studies
rather than a program which would draw together courses from various departments and
lack autonomy, an independent budget, ability to initiate course suggestions, or a separate
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faculty. The report deemed a separate department necessary in order for the professors
and students of black studies to become a cohesive group rather than be divided among
various departments.320
Though the department would remain independent, it would be closely connected
to other departments which offered cross-listed courses and interdisciplinary studies. The
department would include current offerings with new classes on “Economics of the Black
Community,” “Patterns of Black Social Relationship in the United States,” and
“Introduction to African Philosophy.”321 It would provide a minimum of 38 courses.322
The report made specific suggestions about the curriculum of this new
department. It called for an intensive junior year devoted to “helping the student
‘correlate the richness and diversity of Afro-American culture.’” Students would absorb
the history, development, and current status of African and African American culture and
society at this time. In his or her senior year, a student would take a practicum which
would allow him or her to pursue an independent project outside of the university setting.
Examples of this would include community service in an economically deprived area or
studies abroad in Africa.
In From Black Power to Black Studies, Fabio Rojas identifies two versions of
black studies: community education and academic black studies. Community education
aimed at training individuals to become teachers or social workers in a black community.
Such programs focused more on educating African Americans rather than whites. The
other option was academic black studies. These interdisciplinary programs served the
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entire university offering courses to all students. Rojas also notes that these were not
mutually exclusive alternatives.323 At the University of Minnesota, there was certainly an
inclusion of community education, as evidenced by the first course offered, though the
department often leaned more towards academic black studies.
Groups that proposed community education had to maneuver carefully. At the
University of Illinois-Chicago, the black students’ request for external control of a
university program was rejected by the school. Though administrators deemed training
people to work in Chicago schools acceptable, the proposal for community governance
exceeded the limits of acceptability. Rojas argues that framing remained the key issue:
students needed to present their department and course proposal as an extension of the
existing curricula. He writes, “The long-term evolution of black studies within specific
universities is as much a function of institutional rules as it is of activism and
mobilization.”324 At the University of Minnesota, the department was framed primarily
as an extension of existing disciplines like economics, philosophy, history and languages.
Sometimes students pressed for the wrong courses as extensions of existing
disciplines. Students at Cornell asked for approval of “Physical Education 300C: Theory
and Practice in the Use of Small Arms and Hand-to-Hand Combat.”325 In cases like
these, black students often experienced backlash when their demands went beyond the
normal academic bounds.
Moreover, requests that departments be black-controlled and autonomous, or
controlled by the black community, were often met with clear rebuke. Some groups also
demanded that professors be committed to the movement; community activists were
323
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preferable to doctors. Many students wanted courses taught with a distinct black power
ideology, rather than an “objective” or “impartial” framework. Finally, some student
movements requested that white students be excluded from black studies courses or
taught in separate sections.326 With the exception of partial community control, none of
these demands were made at the University of Minnesota. This may in part explain the
department’s acceptance and durability: it intended to operate within acceptable academic
bounds.
On May 19, 1969, the College of Liberal Arts All-College Council, which was
composed of 105 elected faculty members, met to approve the creation of the new
department. A one hour debate preceded the vote. One opponent argued that a black
studies department should be low on the university’s list of priorities as they already
faced overcrowded classes and understaffing in existing departments. He also argued
that the creation of this new department would create the illusion that the university
complied with its duty to black students. In response, a student member of the committee
argued that the department would end delusions by challenging beliefs that black people
possess a distinct odor, that Tarzan led all Africans, that nothing more than massive
jungles cover Africa, and more.327 Despite this argument, a few opponents criticized the
department for “building black mythology.” Though, no report elaborated on this
criticism.328
The University also faced questions about whether the creation of an AfroAmerican Studies Department meant there would be ones for Swedish-Americans,
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Norwegian-Americans, and others. When this question was raised to the Faculty Senate,
one administrator responded that the goal was the creation of a graduate program in
comparative racial and ethnic studies that would look at all groups.329 Moreover, the
university already had a program in Scandinavian Studies. The black studies programs in
Chicago were similarly criticized for not focusing on the large Polish population.330
The opposition also argued that the department was hastily conceived and would
drain resources from other departments. 331 Many of these opponents felt that an
interdepartmental program would be preferable to the creation of the new department.
However, these concerns never appeared to be a significant threat to the proposed
department. In fact, supporters were already looking to the next step: the creation of a
Native American Studies Department which would combine with African American
Studies to allow graduate students to complete a program in comparative ethnic and
racial studies.332
Richard N. Blue wrote an extensive justification for the department in N.B., a
publication of the College of Liberal Arts. He began by identifying the lack of attention
to the contribution of African Americans and juxtaposed it with the University’s
programs in Scandinavian Studies which looked at the contribution of Swedes and
Norwegians.

In presenting his justification, Blue explained why a department was

preferable to a program. He argued that many black people harbored profound distrust of
the ability of existing faculty to adequately understand and teach about the experience of
African Americans. Only a department would have control over the selection of faculty
329
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and the development of a curriculum which would represent the history and culture of
African Americans.333 In fact, a department was key to the survival of black studies
nationwide. For example, the University of Chicago lacked a department. Instead, its
program required yearly approval and remained constantly embattled.334
At the same time, Blue pointed to the difficulty of creating an Afro-American
Studies Department at the University of Minnesota and elsewhere. He identified the lack
of an institutionalized association which defined the criteria for the selection of
specialists. Moreover, the lack of a communication network presented a problem for new
practitioners and departments. As a group, no consensus existed regarding what the work
of professors of black studies should be. Also, because most black studies departments
were just being created, they lacked many people who had an academic degree in the
field to teach. All of this contributed to the increasing likelihood that faculty members
would be opposed to the creation of a new department.335
While justifying the program for the faculty, advocates of black studies also
explained the department’s necessity to the public. In one article, Earl Craig, Jr. argued
that “the most pervasive single fact of the history and contemporary life of the United
States is white racism.” He continued, “every person born and raised in this society
learned to make judgments about others on the basis that white is good and black is not –
or at least not quite as good. And none of us has escaped this malignant tumor. It is
manifested in the hostility of whites toward nonwhites and the self-hatred of blacks
toward themselves and other blacks.” In response, the department would lay the
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foundation for the education of leaders and citizens of American black communities, free
the minds of white students from racism, and humanize an American university. At the
same time, Craig argued that black studies was not a panacea for black freedom and
should not allow itself to become a tool of white radical student movements. Instead, the
department should focus on the production of scholarly material and instruction which
affirms the black experience.336
The Afro-American Studies Department celebrated its inauguration in November,
1969, with a performance of the play, “The Beauty of Blackness,” at Coffman Union.337
However, the department still required continual justification in its early years. In
February of 1970, a lengthy article entitled “Black Studies: ‘U’ Department Is
Establishing Its Legitimacy,” appeared in the St. Paul Pioneer Press. The author, Roger
Bergerson, pointed out that the department had grown to a faculty of ten teaching nine
courses to 250 students, including nine students majoring in black studies. He also drew
attention to the need for continual legitimation: many of the 300 black studies programs
or departments recently established nationwide now faced trouble because of clashes with
the administration and some had already met their demise. However, he pointed out that
the Department of Afro-American Studies at the U of M confronted few problems. One
of the primary issues was that students found courses they wanted full and needed special
permission to take them. This was the kind of problem many departments would have
liked to have. But, finding a permanent chairperson represented an even greater concern.
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Bergerson reported that though the search committee found applicants, none seriously
wanted to move to Minnesota given the small black population.338
In talking to Lillian Anthony, a faculty member of the Department of AfroAmerican Studies, Bergerson learned that humanization stood at the center of the
department’s objectives. Anthony pointed to other departments which simply taught
“how to get through life.” Instead, faculty and students in black studies knew each other
on a first name basis. Beyond that, junior Anna Stanley noted that the department
promoted the view that everyone possessed something to contribute to the learning
process regardless of their academic degree.339
In terms of race, classes generally split equally between black and white. All
instructors desired the presence of white students in black studies courses. Mahmoud ElKati said of white students, “I don’t expect them to vibe with everything, because there’s
a socio-cultural difference between whites and blacks. But after a while, a frame of
reference develops for them.” He and Josie Johnson both stated that they did not intend
the classes to be therapy for guilt-ridden white students. At times, Johnson said white
students might feel uncomfortable with the tough subject matter, though white students
denied any feelings of uneasiness. Black students’ opinions of white students in their
courses ranged from definite approval to indifference.
Black professors also deemed the two white professors, Howard Schneider and
Darrell Shreve, competent and sensitive in their teaching. At the same time, Lillian
Anthony pointed out, “Whites often have the knowledge and methodology to teach black
studies, but not the black consciousness, the black ethos. They haven’t lived what they’re
338
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teaching.”340 Horace Huntley, a student during the first year of the department’s
existence, says that white professors in black studies were sometimes a topic of
discussion. But, it was probably less important a topic at Minnesota than elsewhere. For
him and many others, it was more about what a person had to offer as a teacher: that they
respected the discipline and told the whole truth.341 There is one documented instance
where race may have affected a decision on hiring, but that is in dispute.
In 1973, the department was looking to acquire a visiting professor. George King
nominated Theodore Courrier of Fisk University. His supporters in the department felt
that those in opposition to Courrier wanted to deny him because he was white. However,
Earl Craig argued that he opposed Courrier, not on the basis of race, but because he was
quite conservative and called Martin Luther King, Jr. a communist. Moreover, he
pointed out that the department had recently approved the appointment of Victoria
Coifman, proving that race was not the issue. In the end, Courrier had enough votes to
secure his appointment as a visiting professor despite dissent.342
To Horace Huntley, the most important professor in the new department was
Mahmoud El-Kati. Since their days at The Way Community Center, El-Kati had sparked
an interest in black history for Huntley.343 Horace Huntley became one of the first
graduates of the University of Minnesota with a degree in Afro-American Studies and is
today a professor of history in Birmingham. El-Kati has a Distinguished Lectureship in
American Studies at nearby Macalester College named after him.
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Finding qualified people to teach African American Studies represented a
significant problem in the early years. While there were people in the Twin Cities who
possessed deep knowledge about black history and culture, they often lacked the proper
academic degrees. Even El-Kati did not have the requisite graduate degree. However,
this did not prevent the department from offering challenging courses. Huntley found the
history courses to contain both breadth and depth of material which challenged the
students. But, Huntley thought the most daunting task was learning Swahili.344
Along with its humanizing mission, the department connected with the
community by establishing education and black culture groups at Stillwater Prison and
St. Cloud Reformatory. The prison educations of Malcolm X and Eldridge Cleaver
inspired such programs. Though the department involved itself in the community, most
faculty members felt that more must be done to develop a connection between the two.345
This became a larger problem in the next few years. The department hired one of the
men at the center of the later conflict that January. John Preston Ward, a black civil
rights attorney, was named a visiting professor to teach a class called “Law and Society –
a Minority Point of View” and conduct seminars. At the time, he was completing his
Ph.D. dissertation and directing the Law Reform Division of the Legal Services
Organization of Indianapolis, Inc.346
January 15, 1970, marked the one year anniversary of the takeover. The AfroAmerican Action Committee issued a statement from its Communications Committee
noting the achievement of small, but positive gains at the university. But, they noted that
the response had been severely limited by the nature of the university itself. An editorial
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in the Minnesota Daily concurred noting that the Afro-American Studies Department was
not a result of institutional willingness to accept change but a small group of students,
faculty, and community members acting in defiance of the university. Rose Mary
Freeman stated that the university had not changed much in a year. Communication
difficulties still existed between African Americans and the administration. Moreover,
the university was still a site of institutionalized racism.347
In 1983, Philip Daniel and Asmasu Zike completed a survey report of black
studies programs and departments in America. They found between 130 and 160
programs or departments were created between 1968 and 1971. Older universities (those
founded prior to 1928) represented the site of greatest growth. Moreover, undergraduate
offerings composed the bulk of these programs rather than research training and
advanced degree coursework. During this time, black studies faced “three strenuous
resource draining and goal displacing requirements”: generating interdisciplinary
expertise, experimenting with independent black studies programs, and building viable
departments. Often times, established departments refused to cooperate in the creation of
black studies departments which would likely compete with them for limited resources.
Instead, the authors concluded, “The bedrock foundation for the emergence of
contemporary Black Studies was laid by Black urban, lower-class students as they tried to
get better Black Studies courses from traditional departments.”348
Daniel and Zike’s general conclusions reflect much of the experience at the
University of Minnesota in the early years. Certainly, black students played the decisive
role in the creation of a black studies program as evidenced by the work of the AAAC
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and the Morrill Hall takeover. While the two researchers point out that older universities
represented the site of greatest growth, they overlook the fact that a predominantly white
student body could be found at these universities. There was nothing unique about a
university being older which spurred the creation of black studies programs. However, a
specific trigger could be found in the fact that these schools were majority white and,
correspondingly, seemed to ignore the contributions of African Americans in their
curriculum, forcing a reaction.349
The authors also point out that the black studies programs primarily offered
undergraduate degrees. In the experience of the University of Minnesota, the reasoning
for this becomes quite clear: it was primarily, if not solely, undergraduate students who
were calling for a black studies department and they wanted courses that they could take
immediately. While the university wished to create a graduate program in comparative
and ethnic studies first, the AAAC opposed this because it would not improve the
education of their current members.
Finally, Daniel and Zike cite three problems faced by black studies. The
University of Minnesota certainly faced problems with generating interdisciplinary
expertise. Given the limited number of people with advanced degrees in black studies
and the trouble of attracting them to Minneapolis, the university had to turn to local
people who may have possessed competence, but not the academic degrees which some
would argue were requisite to effective teaching.
Carlos A. Brossard confirmed a nationwide trend, writing that because of a
shortage of finances and competition for resources caused by a recession, newly created
black studies programs often looked to graduate students and new doctorates to staff their
349
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programs. This created a perpetual problem. Since most black studies programs did not
begin by organizing courses and degrees at the graduate level, the shortage of qualified
educators would continue. Moreover, the dearth of resources also meant black studies
programs lacked research funds. So, the field often fell short in producing significant
new scholarship.350
Minnesota’s Afro-American Studies Department, in particular, lacked the funds to
gain professors expert in specific fields, like economics. As Daniel and Zike mention,
many black studies departments found other departments unwilling to cooperate with
them. The opposition to black studies at hearings on the department’s creation certainly
provides evidence of this at the University of Minnesota. Though a situation mentioned
later complicates the idea that other departments were resistant to black studies. Finally,
the two authors note difficulties in building viable departments. Minnesota faced this
with regard to finding qualified faculty, as well as a director. But, the evidence does not
show that the Afro-American Studies Department encountered any seriously troubling
concerns in the early years.
In fact, by the fall of 1970, 600 students were taking courses in the AfroAmerican Studies Department. This was more than double the 250 students taking
courses in the spring of 1970. The university also expanded its offering to 13 courses.
Though, the number of students majoring in black studies fell from nine to six. Part of
the rise in enrollment in black studies may have been connected to the fact that the
department had finally found a leader.351
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George King took the position as head of the department saying, “There is no
mystique in black studies. What we are all about is serious work that will contribute to
the solution of today’s problems.” King came from the Institute for Services to
Education in Newton, Massachusetts, where he developed an interdisciplinary social
science curriculum with emphasis on the African American experience. Receiving his
Ph.D. from Indiana University, King went on to be a part of the faculty at Florida A & M,
Indiana University, Southern University, St. Augustine’s College, and Paine College
before coming to Minnesota.352
The university reported, “Under the new leadership this year of scholar and
historian Dr. George King, the department is functioning as a sound academic unit, a
channel of communication for students who are interested in social reform and as a
resource for black students who are facing personal problems.” The staff focused
specifically on the academic problems of students, many of whom lacked the necessary
college preparation in high school. To meet this challenge, many faculty came in on
Saturdays to provide tutoring, made themselves available for academic and personal
counseling, and met in the department’s all purpose room for after-class discussions.353
Carlos A. Brossard noted, in a larger survey of black studies, that faculty often
found themselves too drained by the rigors of teaching to devote much time to research.
Many undergraduate students in black studies required compensatory education and
support services because their high school education left them lacking in appropriate
academic skills. Faculty needed to work on testing new curriculum ideas which
exhausted much of their time and effort. This affected them on performance evaluations
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which took place as if normal academic conditions applied. In light of this, some
professors focused more on publication at the expense of compensatory education and
improving the department to heighten the results of their evaluations.354
At the same time, the department faced structural problems. With only $200,000
a year, the department was unable to add specialists in communication and economics as
they desired. Moreover, the department’s involvement with the community remained
limited. Though, the faculty did continue to offer non-credit classes in black studies at
Stillwater Prison. The department also considered offering workshops for community
leaders who wished to become involved in politics.355
The department reached an important turning point in May of 1970. This time
saw a nationwide strike to protest U.S. involvement in Cambodia. Following Nixon’s
announcement of the attacks, five thousand students and faculty members at the
University of Minnesota voted to strike. The following day, slightly fewer people
gathered for a Memorial Service for the slain Kent State students. Several hundred
strikers utilized the AAAC’s tactic and occupied Morrill Hall until President Moos
agreed to speak to the crowd outside. In another parallel to the 1969 takeover, protesters
presented five demands to Moos, which included an end to all University actions which
aided the military and the closure of campus.356
African American students met to discuss whether they should participate in the
strike. They concluded that, though they opposed military action in Cambodia, they
would not strike. They offered the rationale that black people had been on strike for 300
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years and it was now time to study to find better ways to handle problems.357 The
department seemed to be moving from protest to academics. This coincided with its shift
away from community involvement.
The following spring, the Afro-American Studies Department held “An Evening
with Muhammad Ali,” to benefit the department’s newly developing scholarship fund.358
The department secured a second visit from him through two faculty members, George
D. King and John Preston Ward. Both had attended Ali’s Supreme Court hearing on
April 19, 1971, concerning his conviction for violation of the Draft Law and persuaded
him to include a stop in the Twin Cities on his already heavy lecture tour.359
Later, in February of 1972, the Afro-American Studies Department again held
events to highlight Black History Week. In this iteration, they focused on “Africa and
Our African Heritage.” The department wished to honor those ancestors who made it
possible for them to say “black power.” The newly organized Community Arts
Productions (CAP) sponsored a variety of community-wide arts and cultural activities.360
While these events were signs of progress and distinction in the department, it
faced its biggest crisis in the fall of 1972 and spring of 1973. On August 24, 1972, a
group of eight black community leaders met with President Malcolm Moos to present a
list of 12 concerns about the department. Primarily, they charged that the local black
community was not sufficiently involved in the department. They also demanded better
teaching which included the elimination of excessive absenteeism among faculty and the
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inappropriate teaching materials and methods they employed.361 The group also
requested that the tuition and fees for minority students eventually be waived. Finally,
they asked that the demands be implemented before school resumed in September.362
The group’s core criticism dealt with the lack of community involvement on the
parts of Professors King and Ward. They attempted to set a meeting with the two
professors but King was out of town and Ward remained difficult to reach. Feeling they
were being ignored, the group took their grievances to President Moos. However, Moos
did not take any action and the situation only got worse over the course of the school
year.
In the month of January, King called community members to plan events for
Black History Week. The procedure was described as tardy and haphazard leaving many
community members confused, unable to make useful suggestions, and unsure if a
sufficient budget even existed. The other, more grievous incident occurred when
Professor King decided not to rehire Earl Craig and informed Mahmoud El-Kati that he
was being let go only a few days before Martin Luther King Day in January. George
King’s decision to old an open meeting at a church on that day to hear concerns from the
community only produced an outpouring of outrage.363
After King arrived one and a half hours late, without apology, he faced a barrage
of questions about the failure to reappoint Craig and El-Kati as well as incessant
heckling. In spite of being called a “black exploiter” and “motherfucker,” among other
things, King calmly attempted to explain the situation. However, he found it impossible
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to overcome criticism and may not have been much concerned that he was unable to do
so.364
The group of complainants held Moos personally responsible for the failure of the
department to meet its original commitments to the black community. However, Moos
responded by saying that it would be as inappropriate for him to interfere in the internal
affairs of the Afro-American Studies Department as it would with any other. Once again,
it would take conflict to spur the administration to take action.
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Chapter 5: Traditional Scholars or “Race Hustlers”? The Crisis of Community
Involvement

The black studies department claimed to be unaware of any dissent in the black
community. Enrollment in black studies courses had increased to 1500 students though
the number of professors fell to seven.365 Similarly, the membership of the AfroAmerican Action Committee grew to 200.366 Thus, it came as a surprise when, on
January 18, 1973, shortly after 5 P.M., an undetermined number of persons walked in to
the Afro-American Studies Department meeting to break it up. Led by Mahmoud ElKati, the group demanded to see his personnel file. Professor King was taken to the
department office to look for it. Meanwhile, a few others broke the door to John Ward’s
office and tore the receiver off the phone to prevent him from calling for help. Moreover,
the group physically attacked Ward, who was completely blind, and George King.367
King claimed that El-Kati grabbed him by his tie and, along with Francisco Lloyd, struck
him with closed fists, while Ward suffered injuries to his shoulder.368
The Central Steering Committee of the AAAC reported that about thirty youth
were present, some of whom were armed.369 The CLA Ad-Hoc Committee found later
on investigating that “there is substantial evidence suggesting that he [Mahmoud El-Kati]
went to the meeting prepared to use violence to secure his object.” Though he only took
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five people with him, many others gathered in the hall.370 The number of people
involved and the use of violence shook the department as many people expressed
continual fear for their personal security or that of their families.371
Francisco Lloyd, an executive officer of the Minnesota Student Association and
president of the AAAC the previous year, denied the AAAC’s account of events. He said
he was there from beginning to end and no more than six or seven people participated
including himself. They simply entered the office to discuss the dismissal of El-Kati.372
The community group who presented the 12 demands to Moos said that if he did
not take steps to meet their proposals, more violence would be likely.373 In response, the
AAAC vowed to protect the faculty from attack or intimidation.374 However, University
Police guarded the department offices for the rest of the week. Ward and King had not
decided by the following week if they wanted to press charges.375 In fact, King did not
give a written statement about the incident to University Police until almost a month
later.376
The incident resulted after King and Ward supposedly fired Earl Craig, Jr. and
Mahmoud El-Kati over a dispute regarding community activism by faculty members.
However, the two department administrators stated that the department just did not have
enough funds to rehire Craig.377 He continued to teach at the School of Public Affairs on
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the Twin Cities campus.378 While El-Kati’s file had been lost, the department stated that
he was let go because he was overly active in the community and refused to comply with
the department’s request to obtain a master’s degree. Alternatively, El-Kati argued that
the department failed to uphold the spirit of its founding which included “going its own
moral way” and not giving too much respect to white institutions.379
This event took place in the midst of black studies being questioned across the
country. Some departments were being downgraded and others threatened with abolition
by administrations which found them irrelevant.380 In response to the incident at the
University of Minnesota, Malcolm Moos set up an advisory committee (The Wilderson
Committee) to counsel him on the controversy. He told the committee to meet with
faculty, students and administrators of the department and with members of the
community. Following that, they were to report their recommendations for resolving the
conflict to the administration of the College of Liberal Arts and himself by the end of the
week.381
At the end of the month, the president relieved Ward and King of their
administrative duties as per the recommendation of his committee, though he allowed
them to continue their teaching duties.382 The committee report charged that King and
Ward’s refusal to meet with the community showed that the department disrespected its
community constituents, preventing it from meeting its mission and goals.383 The
committee also suggested that the administration do something more to provide for the
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safety and freedom of movement of all members of the university. The report seemed to
indicate that the attack on King and Ward was not an isolated incident. The committee
wrote, “one of the important issues brought to the attention of this committee is the
matter of alleged threats, physical intimidation and harassment of faculty members.”384
The Minneapolis Tribune elaborated on the controversy in the department which
came about over a dispute over the proper role of the department in the community which
had occurred over a period of years. The department began with faculty members like
Lillian Anthony, Josie Johnson, Earl Craig, Jr., and Mahmoud El-Kati, who prided
themselves on being very active in the community. The common sentiment was that “the
Ph.D. degree was often an artificial standard of achievement, and that individuals with
major non-academic accomplishments could be a real asset to the program.”385 But,
those activist members gradually left for various reasons and a rift between the
department and the community grew. El-Kati stated that King and Ward justified his
dismissal by claiming he involved himself too much in community affairs. He argued
that King and Ward exemplified “the old school of traditional, scholarly individuals who
are content with their positions and are unwilling to recognize the modern black man”
calling them “classical Negro race hustlers.”386
Meanwhile, the Afro-American Studies Department objected to interference by
some of the black community. An anonymous faculty member said, “There is a
difference between service to the community and control by the community, between
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being responsive to the community and being responsible to them.”387 King responded to
El-Kati and the rest of the community by saying, “The department, as an intellectual and
scholarly entity, does not see itself teaching any specific ideology. That would be
academically dishonest, anti-intellectual and, even more serious, indoctrinating rather
than liberating the minds of students. The department has the responsibility of teaching a
range of ideologies.”388 The AAAC also objected to complaints from the community
which citizens made without asking for student opinions.389
On January 17, a committee of black community representatives led by Ann
Darby of the Minneapolis Urban League presented 12 demands to the College of Liberal
Arts in an 8-page letter. The three major proposals outlined in the document were: to
establish a community board to advise the department, to eliminate all tuition and fees for
“third world students” and to include local black people as part of the teaching staff. The
initial department charter included no provision for a community advisory board, but one
existed until the department dissolved it in April, 1970.390 Similarly, local people like
Mahmoud El-Kati composed the initial teaching staff of the department. Essentially, the
letter called for a return to the way things were when the department began.
In early February, John Webb, associate dean of the CLA and acting chairman of
the Afro-American Studies Department, said that the department would open itself to
criticism and advice from outsiders but retained the right to determine its own policies.
He stated that the department wished to give more attention to the community and
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eliminate tuition and fees for students in need. The latter, however, required the attention
of the regents and the state legislature. He also pointed out that five of nine black faculty
members in the department considered themselves members of the local community as
they had resided in the Twin Cities for a number of years.391
The faculty stood fully behind King and Ward on the issue of community
involvement. Some faculty members said that the staff was prepared to resign en masse
if the two were not reinstated. They also pointed out that King and Ward had been
working for months to establish an Afro-American Studies Center in the black
community which would lend itself to more direct community involvement, research, and
action. Moreover, the department had been training school personnel for the pending
desegregation of the Minneapolis public schools.392
Darrell Shreve, a member of the Department of Afro-American Studies faculty,
wrote an editorial in the Minnesota Daily entitled, “A case of institutional racism?” He
charged that the Department of Afro-American Studies was receiving different treatment
than any other university department would in this kind of dispute. He accused President
Moos of crusading to eliminate King and Ward from the department. He pointed out that
Moos did not condemn the violence against King and Ward. Furthermore, the president
acted to remove George King, the department chairperson, without allowing him a
chance to respond to the charges. And, he did so under the advice of a committee that
included one of the complainants against the department, Harry Davis. King had stated
in a meeting at Zion Baptist Church on January 15 that he would respond to the concerns
if the group of complainants would send them to the department. The group had
391

Mike Shelby, “Afro-American Studies department acting chairman responds to ad hoc committee from
Black community,” Minnesota Daily, February 1, 1973, 1.
392
Richard Gibson, “Squabble over Afro studies began small, but it’s growing,” no page given.

124
presented the concerns to President Moos last August, but not to the department.393 The
feeling of mistreatment among members of the department continued through the month
as the Minnesota Daily reported on February 20 that the department faculty was still
totally dissatisfied. They did not trust Webb, the temporary chair, and felt no other
department would be treated as they had been.394
The following month, George King accused the university of institutional racism
in an interview with the Minnesota Daily. King responded to the Wilderson Committee’s
assertion that part of the reason he was removed from his chair was that he and other
department faculty refused to participate in the investigation. King stated that he and
other department members made known that they would cooperate when they knew what
charges were being made against them. He had submitted three questions to the Dean of
the CLA which went unanswered. King welcomed community input but emphasized that
the department retained the right to chart its own course. On the issue of community
involvement, he concluded, “When we hear the term ‘Black community,’ that’s a
misnomer. There are communities and then there is what we call the ‘silent majority’
that supports and upholds our intent to be a quality, academically excellent department of
Black Studies at the University.”395
George King also responded specifically to the dispute over the firing of
Mahmoud El-Kati. He said that the department’s Personnel and Tenure Committee
decided to dismiss El-Kati and, given that he was a temporary faculty member, they
required no reason for letting him go. Personally, King felt that El-Kati had spread
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himself too thin by taking a position at the University of Minnesota while also working at
nearby Macalester College and at a school in Wisconsin.396
Lastly, King noted the deleterious consequences of this dispute for the
department. He argued that prior to the disruption,
there was no other Afro-American studies program in the country that had
the status, the prestige, the reputation and the staff that the program at
Minnesota had. However, because of the accusations, violence, and
firings, the department found itself unable to follow through on a number
of important projects…the success of which depend[ed] on [King’s] own
personal status, character and reputation, all of which [were] in danger
now; some of which [he had] already lost.397
He concluded with a foreboding statement, saying, “I think what needs to be pointed out
is the fact that the department is somewhat in limbo. In a time of financial stringency, of
retrenchment and reallocation, that means virtually death for a department.”398
In his broader survey of black studies, Carlos Brossard points out that, of all the
barriers, interpersonal disputes over ideological differences and national backgrounds
appeared to be the most unexpected and hardest to address. While he points out that this
had the benefits of dispelling the myth of racial unification and offering a variety of
models of black studies, these conflicts produced increasingly fragmented programs and
departments.399 The statement certainly held true for the University of Minnesota.
The removal of King and Ward from their administrative duties led to an
investigation by the American Association of University Professors (AAUP). The
committee intended to “clear the air of irresponsible rumor,” study the actions of
administrators lacking in accountability, and look at the influence of groups outside the
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university.400 The AAUP later expressed three concerns based on its investigation:
university officials should guard against permitting outside groups to attempt to dictate to
a department, they need to follow procedural regulations with regard to suspension and
firing, and they must clarify procedures for relieving department chairs of their duties.401
At the same time, Mahmoud El-Kati attempted to appeal the decision to not re-hire him.
However, as a temporary faculty member on a 9-month appointment, he possessed few
routes for reconsideration.402
Though the AAAC opposed the ad hoc community group that presented the
demands, a student ad hoc committee was created called Concerned Black Students.
They felt, much like the community group, that the department had changed and needed
to return to its original charter. They argued that many community members had
valuable teaching resources to offer even though they lacked the usual academic degrees.
Finally, they called for the creation of two community offices to reach out to African
Americans in the Twin Cities.403
On March 16, almost two months after the incident, George King filed charges
against six people for the January assault and on March 20 they were arraigned in
Hennepin County Municipal Court. The grand jury charged Milton Williams (Mahmoud
El-Kati), Francisco Lloyd, and George Taylor (Zulu Vusumuzi) with assault and breach
of the peace while they charged Willa Mae Dixon, Wade Mann, and Felix Welch (Cojo
Iodienga) with the latter.404
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At the same time, an Interim Advisory Committee on Afro-American Studies was
established as per the recommendation of the Wilderson Committee.405 Seventeen people
composed this group, which included faculty, community members, and students.
Interestingly, two people at the center of the initial dispute, Ward and El-Kati, both sat on
the advisory committee. The department responded to the creation of this committee by
passing a resolution which stated that if the College of Liberal Arts considered a
committee composed of members outside the department and outside the university a
valid method for evaluation, then they must apply that rule to all departments.406 Again,
they felt the effects of institutionalized racism.
In April, King was reinstated as chairman for the balance of his term which ended
on June 15. The CLA committee recommended his reinstatement because of the
procedural problems surrounding his removal. King had not been afforded due process
when suspended, meaning Moos and others failed to notify him of the charges, give him
an opportunity to reply, and complete a full investigation before his removal. The CLA
committee noted that such impropriety could open the university to legal action. In
recommending his reinstatement, the committee also suggested that he not be reappointed
at the end of his term because of his insensitivity in dealing with members of the black
community. In regards to John Ward, the committee pointed out that he did not actually
hold the position of Assistant Chairman of the Department, so Moos had no position to
remove him from to begin with. At the same time, the committee recommended that
Ward not be appointed to succeed King.
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The committee also found no evidence of misconduct with regard to the firings of
Craig and El-Kati. With respect to community involvement, they found a number of
ways to interpret the mission of the department and concluded that it should make efforts
to bridge the gap with the community but this should not extend to “direct service to
specific problems at hand (in the community).”407 On June 15, King was asked by the
Dean of the College of Liberal Arts to continue to serve as chairman until an appropriate
recommendation could be made by committees regarding his reappointment.408
The case against El-Kati and others ended up going to court in May. One piece of
evidence was an hour-long audio tape of the event. Though unintelligible at times, ElKati could be heard pleading with King to give him his personnel file, which still had not
been found since the incident.409 The tape showed that King agreed to allow El-Kati to
look at his file, but only after the meeting concluded. However, El-Kati insisted on
seeing his file immediately.410 King refused and testified that El-Kati and two students,
one of whom was Francisco Lloyd, grabbed him and manhandled him to the door of the
room where files were kept.411 El-Kati agreed that King had been roughed up but that he
and the other two defendants were not the ones responsible.412 The tape also revealed a
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woman’s voice indicating she wanted to hide or destroy El-Kati’s file before the police
arrived.413
The defense attempted to prove King’s lack of credibility. They contended that
King presented a false description of the relationship between the department and the
community. Even worse, they argued that he and Ward attended department faculty
meetings under the influence of alcohol. King admitted on the stand that he had a glass
of port at lunch, but nothing more.414 They also questioned King’s motives because he
waited so long to file charges. King said he waited “because of the highly charged
atmosphere and for fear for my own life.” He also argued that state property had been
destroyed. In instances like that, the university usually took the initiative to investigate
and file charges. Vusumizi Zulu, defending himself, argued that King brought charges
because he was embarrassed by criticism from the community and wanted to fight back
in some way. He also argued that King exaggerated the disruption caused by the
confrontation asking, “Are you aware that meetings tend to be loud when groups of Black
people are discussing Black issues and that abusive language is often used?” King
rejected the premise of the question entirely.415
After only three-and-a-half days of testimony, both sides in the case agreed to
submit evidence and sworn statements to the Judge Patrick W. Fitzgerald rather than
continue oral testimony. The judge would then decide the case by the end of the month.
Alongside King, Ward was the only other person to testify before the oral arguments
ended. He asserted that he could identify all six assailants, though he was blind. Ward
413
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said he could pick them out based on voice, footsteps, and other aural qualities. He also
described injuries to his left arm and shoulder. In response, the defense argued that Ward
provided biased testimony because of his close connection to King.416
Finally, Mahmoud El-Kati presented a general statement to the court rather than
bench testimony before the decision went to the judge. He said he did not want to create
more chaos in the community by continuing the open trial. El-Kati argued that the trial
should not have taken place to begin with. Rather, the black community should have
judged the issue and had the means to settle disputes such as this.417
At the end of the month, Judge Fitzgerald presented his verdict in the trail. He
called it “far and away the most important case that [he had] been called upon to
resolve.”418 The three men accused of simple assault were found guilty. All six were
found innocent of breach of the peace. The judge ordered a pre-sentence investigation of
the three convicted men which was expected to take about two weeks.
El-Kati had hoped to use the trial as a forum to publicize the lack of community
involvement and the failure of the department to fulfill its charter. Judge Fitzgerald
allowed testimony which ranged beyond the limits of the incident on January 18 which
accommodated this purpose. However, El-Kati felt that the trial did not meet his
objective.419 Cojo Iodienga was equally upset as the trial did not resolve political
problems between the department and the black community. Like El-Kati, he stated that
the court could not determine guilt or innocence and that assault was not the issue.

416

Steven Johnson, “Defense, prosecution agree judge will decide El-Kati case,” Minnesota Daily, May 22,
1973.
417
Ibid.
418
Steven Johnson, “El-kati, 2 others found guilty of assault,” Minnesota Daily, June 1, 1973, 1, 9.
419
Harley Sorensen, “Three found guilty of hitting ‘U’ department head,” Minneapolis Tribune, June 1,
1973, 16B.

131
Rather, the primary problem was King’s accountability and the black community must
decide what should be done.420
In analyzing the conflict over community involvement, the CLA Ad-Hoc
Committee to Recommend Action with Respect to the Status of Professor George D.
King found a number of conflicting approaches to black studies. The committee first
examined the department’s charter which called for the program to be designed to meet
current social and community needs. Many community leaders interpreted this to mean
that the department would provide direct community service. However, many professors
in the department in 1973 took this to mean that they would train students to work on
problems facing black communities.421
Besides looking at the charter, the committee also looked over the proposals
which led to the creation of the department. They found, “The proposals do not disclose
any special emphasis upon continuing faculty services to the black community other than
in training students for eventual service there, nor upon any structured educational
programs to be conducted by the Department within the black community. Nor is there
the slightest reference to a special role for leaders of the black community in policy
direction of the Department.”422 However, that could be altered with changes in the
department’s charter.
The CLA committee isolated three different approaches to community
involvement for black studies departments and recommended what they viewed as the
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best option. First, the department could act as service agency to give advice and
assistance regarding a number of community problems. Second, black professors and
students could interact with the local black community to better understand problems and
adjust their courses to account for them. This would help the students become more
attuned to important issues in the process of training to become leaders, teachers, and
social workers in black communities. Third, the department would be almost entirely
academically oriented. Though it would train intellectual leaders of black communities,
there would be no institutional bridge to the community beyond individual contacts that
faculty maintained and wished to incorporate. In no case would the department be
obligated to take direction from the black community. The committee felt that the second
approach represented the best balance, though it was not necessitated by the department’s
current charter.423
The committee found that the department seemed to start out with the second
approach but was moving towards the third under the direction of faculty like King and
Ward. The community, which felt a strong connection to the department in the first few
years, slowly watched that connection disappear. Initially, an Advisory Committee
existed which included members drawn from the community. But, after the first year, it
dissolved on its own accord and handed the reins entirely to the department leadership.
Similarly, the department began with many faculty drawn from the local community.
But, as those instructors left for other endeavors and new teachers with the requisite
academic degrees became available, the situation changed.424
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The Committee came out strongly against the community requests for “black
liberation ideology as the focal point of black studies,” community education, and
especially community control of the department. They argued that black liberation
ideology and community control would “compromise the constitutionally autonomous
position of the University as an agency of the State serving the entire population.” These
proposals would also open the university to embarrassing questions by accrediting
agencies and hurt the academic freedom of professors in the department. Finally,
community education programs would quickly diminish resources intended for students
enrolled in the university.425 The CLA report directed that the department re-write its
charter using language which clearly stated its relationship to the community. The report
strongly suggested that the department focus on training students to work in black
communities and build a connection with the local black community to improve that
training.
In August, the Interim Advisory Committee, along with an external review
committee which had been formed, released their recommendations for the improvement
of the Afro-American Studies Department. One of the foremost suggestions was that the
department establish at least two community extension offices, one in Minneapolis and
one in St. Paul. These centers were to “provide a situation for black people to come
together to revitalize their cultural heritage as African people.”426 Of course, this had
already been in King and Ward’s planning. Moreover, the department was advised to
draft a new statement of purpose, increase the number of tenured faculty, and mandate
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research for faculty members.427 The report also noted other academic limitations saying
that the department was not getting enough cooperation from other departments, its
curriculum was too narrow, and that its morale was low.428 In order to meet these goals,
the committee recommended that the department’s $150,000 budget be doubled. The
Dean of the CLA, E.W. Ziebarth, at the end of his tenure, said some of the
recommendations would be implemented but did not specify which ones.429
Though they made a complaint about the lack of support from other disciplines,
the report of the CLA Ad-Hoc Committee points out that the department, on at least one
occasion, rejected interdepartmental cooperation. Professor Philip Porter of the
Geography Department brought forth a proposal for a program in African Studies to be
operated jointly with the Afro-American Studies Department. However, most members
of the department wanted their own “all-black program of African studies” and rejected
the proposal. They did not wish to allow another department to gain control of an area
they thought should be housed solely in their department. Moreover, some felt that
working with another department would send the message that the Afro-American
Studies Department lacked the competence to handle the program on its own. Other
departments also attempted to form cooperative relationships but found the professors of
in Afro-American Studies unresponsive.430 This represents an interesting point for
departure. Many scholars point out the failure of other departments to support black
studies departments. However, it would be useful to find the instances in which black
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studies departments rejected cooperation in a desire to maintain autonomy, which also
remained a central concern of many new departments.
To the dismay of many in the community, the new Dean of the College of Liberal
Arts, Frank J. Sorauf approved King’s appointment to another term as Chair of the
Department of Afro-American Studies. He commended King’s leadership in shifting the
department from activism to academics saying, “It’s beginning to behave like an
academic institution.” This approval was not shared by Gleason Glover of the Urban
League who warned that “to isolate the Afro-American department from the community
at this time would be detrimental to the present black students on campus, the entire black
community and the future of the black struggle.” Mahmoud El-Kati again stated his
opposition to “reactionary Negroes” who hustle blacks and remain aloof to the needs of
the black community. Many black students also opposed King’s reappointment and
planned to form a committee for a protest that they said could be bigger than Morrill
Hall. However, there is no evidence this ever materialized. King remained the chair for
another year.431
In the fall of the following year, Geneva Southall took over as head of the
department after King resigned for personal reasons that summer, completing one year of
his three-year appointment. He remained a professor in the department. His
replacement, Geneva Southall, was a musicologist who received her Master’s Degree
from the American Conservatory of Music and a Ph.D. degree in music literature and
piano performance from the University of Iowa. Southall began her term by saying she
was optimistic. From her perspective, most of the problems between the community and
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the department resulted from misinformation or no information which was exploited “by
some people who could care less about black folks being together.”432
Southall seemed committed to increasing the community connection to the
department. She stated that she was not a “no comment” person and would be happy
talking to people about the department’s programs. Moreover, she combined her
religiosity with community involvement by visiting a different church in the black
community each week to let them know what the department was doing. Finally, she
stated that her administrative philosophy was to keep all parts of the department working
together.433
At the time Southall took over, the department had 14 faculty members and 2500
students enrolled in courses, 90 percent of whom were non-black.434 Though black
studies at the University of Minnesota and elsewhere was originally conceived by and for
black students, the primary beneficiaries at these predominantly white universities were
white students. Clyde C. Clements, Jr. declared in the Negro American Literature
Forum, “The legitimate functions of black studies for black students embracing a
realization of ethnic identity, creation of black leadership, and remedy for white studies
have been pronounced. But white students, fed by stereotypes from past literature and
history and stimulated by reporting in the newspapers and television which focuses on the
riots and sit-in of the racial crisis, need black studies just as badly.”435
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Besides appointing Southall as chair, in 1974, the department also restructured its
senior seminar. The program was originally intended to expose students to local and
national visiting scholars concerning the black experience and help them acquire greater
research skills by working on a senior paper. They continued to work towards this goal.
However, the alterations helped to make the senior seminar more inclusive of staff and
local community resources.436
Under the leadership of Southall, the community connection grew even stronger
the following year. The department applied for funds to hire a full-time community
program assistant and appointed Gary Hines. The Afro-American Studies Department
did not want to create a position tied up with teaching responsibilities. Instead, they
wished to hire someone who could devote their full work time to maintaining the bond
between the department and the community. In doing this, they modeled the Indian
Studies Department which had two community program assistants and the Chicano
Studies Department which employed one. Beyond that, the department offered a free
course entitled “Central City Community Development” which held classes at the Black
Cultural Resource Center in St. Paul. Finally, they worked to add more merit-based
scholarships to attract more majors.437
In a further effort at building a stronger community connection, in the winter of
1976, the Afro-American Studies Department released the second issue of its newsletter,
Outreach. The 10-page document included detailed information on each of the faculty
members, senior seminar topics, the role of oral data in black studies, alumni profiles,
Black History Week, and community consultants in the department’s classes. At the
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beginning of the newsletter, Dr. Frank Wilderson, the Vice President of Student Affairs,
noted, “The University of Minnesota’s Afro-Department, like others throughout the
country, has gone through a period where serious questions were asked concerning its
viability – I am happy to say that it answered in the affirmative…Others have come and
gone, but there is evidence that this one is growing and is here to stay.”438
In the newsletter, Geneva Southall pointed out the numerous ways in which the
department was increasing community involvement. During Black History Week, faculty
and black studies majors went to several public schools to act as speakers and resources
consultants. The department was involved in getting signatures on petitions for
responsible Police Firearms Use Policy to stop the killing of blacks in the Twin Cities’
communities. She elaborated on the course “Central City Community Development.” It
was offered in the Fall Quarter in St. Paul and in the Winter Quarter in Minneapolis.
Students in the course presented their projects at Zion Baptist Church in Minneapolis so
they could get feedback from persons with expertise in the community development and
those in the community who would be affected by such policies.439
Unfortunately, at that time, the department also faced a dispute over autonomy.
King and Ward became vocal opponents of the appointment of five adjunct faculty by the
administration. Though the two were not opposed to the people appointed per se, they
took exception to their approval by administrative fiat rather than departmental
consideration. King and Ward argued that the five adjuncts would have a say in the
department despite being outsiders. The department would lack any control over them.
The two concluded by charging institutional racism saying such action would never be
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taken with a predominantly white department. Alternatively, Geneva Southall, the
department chair, approved of the appointments saying they would add prestige to the
African Studies program. She felt the new adjunct faculty had their “hearts, souls, and
guts with [the] department for a long time.”440
Fabio Rojas observes that black studies departments still have not yet achieved
autonomy. He writes this in reference to the fact that the professors in black studies
departments are trained in many disciplines and teach non-black studies courses.441
However, he seems to overlook the more overt ways in which black studies programs
lacked or still lack autonomy. This example from the University of Minnesota, as well as
others, shows that administrative fiat could still violate departmental autonomy in ways
that would be quite unusual for long-standing, more “traditional” departments.
By 1980, William David Smith and Albert C. Yates reported in the Journal of
Black Studies that many African American studies programs had died over the last twelve
years. In their analysis, lack of financial resources served as the main reason for
discontinuing such programs. But, they also noted the lack of community support, lack
of student interest, poor politics, incompetent teachers and incompetent and uncommitted
administrators as contributing factors. In regard to teachers and administrators, the
authors identified the common misconception that “blackness” provided the qualification
for one to teach black studies. They also pointed to institutionalized sexism which meant
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few black women occupied administrative positions in black studies. Overall, black
studies had not achieved the desired success and respectability.442
Though the department at the University of Minnesota remained exempt from
most of these problems, it faced financial difficulties like other departments nationwide.
An article in the school newspaper during the final month of 1981 presented a striking
figure: each day, the state spent $1.3 million that it did not have.443 This made the
department fearful of their budgetary future.444 This was fairly typical of black studies
program. Rojas finds that black studies programs atrophied in the 1980s, but as long as
they had departmental status, they could later be rehabilitated.445 Delores Aldridge and
Carlene Young agree, writing, “Departmental status has proved to be the most efficacious
for achieving desired goals of scholarship, faculty autonomy, institutional stability, and
student support networks.”446 Alternatively, William E. Nelson Jr. points out,
On campuses where programs were not undergirded by the impact of a
strong student movement and were not linked to broader community
interests, Black Studies frequently took the form of non-autonomous
coordinating units, with the bulk of the faculty and the courses associated
with the program being institutionally lodged in a traditional department.
Many of these programs have been greatly stifled with regard to their
continuing growth and progress. A number of them have not been able to
surmount institutional barriers to their survival. Faced with budgetary
retrenchments and increased pressure from students for institutional
reforms, many colleges and universities have decided to dismantle their
Black Studies units.447
The following January, 1982, Fred Lukermann, Dean of the College of Liberal
Arts, proposed scaling back the Department of Afro-American Studies and other minority
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studies departments. He argued that since black students frequently majored in other
areas, the funds needed to be sent elsewhere. Lukermann proposed that the department
take on a faculty that held shared appointments instead of isolating itself and engaging in
“de facto segregation.” The dean also stated that he could not guarantee that department
requests for courses would be met. In response, the chair of the department, Earl Scott,
noted his concern that such a system would hurt the program as home departments would
be hostile to their faculty holding joint appointments with Afro-American Studies and
work to eliminate the department. Moreover, the professors holding joint appointments
would be more loyal and committed to their home departments where the job security
lay.448
Scott argued that the true concern should not be cutting the department’s budget
in response to state financial problems and low enrollment, but to encourage increased
enrollment. He claimed that the low number of black students majoring in AfroAmerican and African Studies was due to the difficulty in identifying the subfields
available. Scott said that many people remained unaware of the department’s existence
and often thought it was just a counseling center.449
The flagging interest in black studies at the University of Minnesota was quite
typical. Fabio Rojas finds that most schools experienced a burst of enthusiasm following
black student revolts, but the departments and programs later found themselves with only
a core group of students. At Harvard, the department saw significant interest following
the triumphant student revolt, but by 1972, enrollment had already noticeably dropped
and the faculty felt embattled. However, black studies survived and was later resurrected
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because it had departmental status, rather than simply being a program.450 The same held
true at the University of Minnesota. Though interest remained high until the late 1970s,
the department faced budgetary setbacks and waning interest in the early 1980s.
Fortunately, because it held departmental status, it was able to survive.
In response to proposed cuts, minority students banded together to publicly
protest and testify to the Board of Regents. Though the administration announced cuts in
April of 1983, by July they announced renewed support for these departments. Officials
said they would strengthen minority studies programs by hiring new professors and
working to increase student enrollment. Afro-American and African Studies were
fortunate in these times of budget shortages that they were departments rather than
programs, which protected them from easily being cut. At the same time, the department
still required protection and promotion.451 A movement still proved necessary to ensure
its existence.
The administration presented four techniques it would employ to increase the
visibility and enrollment of its minority studies departments: cross-crediting courses,
having professors offer courses outside their home departments, having minority studies
departments which did not have graduate programs work with the aid of graduate
students in other departments to complete research, and have faculty from other
departments join minority studies as adjuncts. Regarding black studies specifically, the
administration offered funding for two visiting professors and a search committee for a
joint English and Afro-American Studies professor. The department survived the early
1980s. Alternatively, the American Indian Studies Department had lost its last tenured
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faculty member and was composed entirely of visiting professors and professors from
other departments. That department was facing elimination.452
The case of the University of Minnesota proves Fabio Rojas’ conclusion from
studying the University of Chicago. He writes,
The lesson from the decline of African American studies at the University
of Chicago is that being consistent with an organization’s culture is not
enough to ensure the long-term survival of a movement outcome.
Bureaucratic neglect and confusion can easily erode a policy or work
unit…Without the constant pressure generated by a social movement, the
outcome withers.453
A black studies department required the constant pressure of a black student movement to
ensure it remains intact.
It seems that the Afro-American Studies Department at the University of
Minnesota was the exception to the harsher trends which eliminated departments and
programs at other colleges and universities. The program is still going strong. As John
Wright points out, the department found the needed financial support. While other
departments around the country dealt with institutionalized sexism, a black woman often
chaired the department (though this does not offer conclusive proof). Rather than dealing
with a lack of community support, the department often faced concerns with too much
community involvement in the department. The number of students enrolling in black
studies courses indicated that student interest was renewed and the program would be
there to stay.
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Chapter 6: “A Small Revolution”: Assessment and Conclusions about Black
Studies at the University of Minnesota

This case study offers many interesting affirmations and exceptions to broader
trends in the black studies movement, particularly as documented by Fabio Rojas. In his
work on black studies, Rojas takes a sociological and historical approach to social
movement efforts for change. He finds that, “Disruptive protests have no impact on
structural change”; non-disruptive protest has a significant effect. Rojas lists sit-ins as an
example of disruptive protest. He writes, “Perhaps the largest schools respond negatively
to protests. It is possible that administrators at schools with an extremely large number of
academic programs might try to institute African American studies within existing
programs as a quick response to protests. Future research can address this conjecture.”454
In looking at the University of Minnesota, one of the largest in the country, one
can conclude that the overall response to the disruptive sit-in protest was positive, rather
than negative as Rojas’ work presumes. While a significant contingent of largely white
detractors existed, the university administration implemented the AAAC’s demands. In
fact, their actions before the sit-in suggested they planned to implement black studies
within existing courses. Only after the Morrill Hall takeover did they take clear steps to
create the Afro-American Studies Department. Moreover, once three students faced
indictment for their actions, the public sentiment shifted to strong support for them. In
this respect, Rojas’ work would benefit from looking beyond the public reaction to black
student takeovers to how support might have shifted in instances where students faced
harsh punishment for their protest efforts at places like the University of Minnesota and
454
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San Fernando Valley State. It is perhaps because the takeover did not become an
“extreme disruption,” which Rojas says can prevent elites from acting on behalf of black
students, that the AAAC was able to see their goals met.455 The absence of violence,
because of both the AAAC non-violent action and the administration’s decision not to
involve the police, allowed many elites to support the organization in its efforts. The
university leadership could defend their decisions to the public and in front of the
legislature. One can image that, had the takeover turned violent, the administration could
not have justified sealing an agreement with the students.
Rojas’ finding that the proportion of students who were black failed to have a
significant impact on program or department creation is definitely affirmed by the events
in Minnesota.456 With less than one percent of the student body, African Americans
represented a small minority of the campus population. Yet, like their counterparts at
other universities, they were able to achieve the creation of a black studies department.
The common connection among the various groups was not that they commanded a
significant force on campus, but that they were organized and willing to fight for their
department.457 Because of students’ dedication to change, Peniel Joseph calls black
studies one of the most successful manifestations of black power. He argues that it
increased the number of African American students, staff and faculty, raised political
consciousness among many African Americans and some white students, and contributed
to making the university a site of political and ideological struggle.458
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Alternatively, William Van Deburg writes of the process of change during the
black student revolts,
Whereas the process of implementing change in the university curriculum
traditionally moved at a snail’s pace, student activists demanded
immediate action. Shrillness, confusion over priorities, and the militants’
unbending stance muddied the relevant educational issues they raised. As
a result, the implementation phase of the Black Studies revolution became
a case study in the creation of academic chaos, misunderstanding, and
mutual ill will.459
Fortunately, the University of Minnesota found itself exempt from many of these broader
conclusions. Van Deburg’s claim about the confusion over priorities may have applied to
the AAAC. The group wanted a department that its members could become a part of
immediately. While this desire is understandable, such an unbending position led them to
refuse the creation of a graduate program first which would have trained people to
become educators in undergraduate courses which lacked qualified professors. However,
the argument that this led to academic chaos does not hold. The department remained
quite stable in its early years and only faced serious conflict and ill-will during the
dispute over community involvement.
At the University of Minnesota, enrollment of minority students rose, more black
faculty members joined the school, and black and white students alike were made more
conscious of the role of race in American life through courses offered by the department.
Stanford Lehmberg and Ann Pflaum argue that the Morrill Hall takeover was “the
demonstration that created the strongest legacy and clearest outcome” at the University of
Minnesota. It led directly to the creation of the Afro-American and African Studies
departments and paved the way for American Indian Studies and Chicano Studies in
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Minnesota.460 This ripple effect also extended over time as more and more people were
educated in black history and culture.
The necessity of teaching white people about black history and culture was noted
in a university report at the time of the takeover which concluded, “One belief expressed
by these men [representatives of the Office of the University President] is that the extent
of racist sentiment at the University--and by implication, throughout the state of
Minnesota—had not been realized by most white people before this confrontation.”461 A
black studies program likely helped to ameliorate this situation. William E. Nelson Jr.
speaks to the impact of black studies when writing,
Black students with a substantial grounding in Black Studies have tended
to leave the university with a greater grasp of the realities of American life
than those who have not been trained in Black Studies. Students trained in
Black Studies are less susceptible to manipulation by negative racial
stereotypes, and manifest a higher degree of racial consciousness and
pride. Armed with in-depth information about the worldwide black
experience, they are motivated to establish enduring commitments to the
advancement of the interest of the black community. Given the black
community’s need for trained and dedicated leadership, the role of Black
Studies in instilling a high sense of racial consciousness in black students
represents a noteworthy contribution of inestimable value. Many white
students have also profited from the Black Studies experience. These
students have gained a greater appreciation of the contributions of blacks
to world society, and the artificial barriers placed in the way of black
progress by racism and economic exploitation. Consequently, they have
left the university with a more realistic perception of the black
community; this fact has enabled them to more effectively cope with the
demands and requirements produced by a multiracial society.462
Marie Braddock Williams contends that the importance of the Morrill Hall
takeover and the creation of a black studies department lay in the increased recognition
and respect accorded to African Americans at the University of Minnesota. Black people
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began to feel more like a part of the university and humanized in the eyes of their fellow
students. Though the action may have been extreme, Williams wonders how long it
would have been before black people were recognized at the university had the takeover
not occurred.463
Finally, Fabio Rojas asserts that “universities are one of the most difficult
institutions to change in modern society.” Because the creation of a new department
requires the approval of faculty, administration, as well as external supervising boards,
change is often halted by one or many hurdles.464 Given this, the fact that a group of less
than 100 students managed to change a bureaucratic behemoth for the intellectual and
social benefit of themselves and others becomes all the more remarkable. It might well
be deemed “a small revolution.”
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